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[957] 
Does Antidiscrimination Law  
Influence Religious Behavior?  
An Empirical Examination 
Netta Barak-Corren* 
What role should the behavioral reality of conflicts regarding gender, sexuality, and 
religious convictions play in the theory and doctrine of antidiscrimination law? Although 
the past several decades have seen broadening tension between traditional beliefs and 
legal and societal norms—the most recent manifestation being Obergefell v. Hodges—
almost no empirical work has been done to elucidate the behavioral reality of conflicts 
between religion and antidiscrimination law. 
 
This Article is the first empirical behavioral study on the decisions made by religious 
people under norm conflict. Drawing on two decision experiments with over 3500 
religious individuals and in-depth interviews with senior religious managers, this Article 
examines the central theoretical explanations for why people (dis)obey the law. Is 
compliance more successfully achieved by improving the perceived fairness of judicial 
proceedings (as predicted by the procedural fairness theory) or by adjusting the outcomes 
of these proceedings (as predicted by the economic analysis theory)? Conventional 
wisdom assumes that greater fairness and milder outcomes would facilitate compliance. 
However, the data suggest that greater procedural fairness has little to no impact on 
compliance decisions, while milder outcomes that afford monetary penalties as substitutes 
for legal compliance are not perceived as more acceptable and actually erode adherence 
to legal norms rather than promoting it. This Article discusses the broader implications of 
my findings for religious accommodations, offering recommendations to lawmakers who 
wish to mitigate conflicts between law and religion without relinquishing fundamental 
legal commitments. 
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Introduction 
Every few months, a teacher in the United States is dismissed for 
becoming pregnant out of wedlock or through in vitro fertilization 
(“IVF”).1 For their employers—typically parochial schools—these 
 
 1. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch. Inc., 680 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding 
dismissal for conception three weeks prior to wedding may proceed to trial), No. 6:10-cv-871-ACC-
TBS, 2012 WL 5896367 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2012) (finding in favor of teacher); Herx v. Diocese of 
Fort Wayne-South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (providing dismissal for undergoing 
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pregnancies contradict the values and doctrine they seek to model. 
Teachers are often contractually committed to upholding the teachings 
and values of the Church,2 and schools view the behavior of these 
pregnant employees—whether they are unmarried or unable to conceive 
without medical intervention—as a violation of this commitment. 
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act permits religious 
employers to give preference in hiring to people of shared faith, it 
arguably does not permit them to discriminate on the basis of gender or 
pregnancy, nor does it exempt them from other civil rights laws.3 This 
enduring tension between religion and antidiscrimination is rapidly 
expanding to new frontiers including gay rights4 and access to 
 
IVF treatment to conceive a child with husband may proceed to trial), No. 1:2012-cv-122-RLM, 2015 
WL 143977 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 12, 2015) (finding jury award of $1.95 million, which was later reduced 
pursuant to Title VII’s cap). IVF treatments typically result in multiple fertilized eggs, only one or two 
of which are implanted back into the womb. The Catholic Church and others view this selection 
process as abortion. See Evan Bleier, Teachers Fired from Massachusetts Catholic School for Out-of-
Wedlock Pregnancy, UPI (Dec. 9, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://www.upi.com/Odd_News/2013/12/09/ 
Teachers-fired-from-Massachusetts-Catholic-school-for-out-of-wedlock-pregnancy/1321386618996/; Laura 
Hibbard, Cathy Samford, Texas Teacher, Fired for Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy, Huffington Post (Apr. 
12, 2012, 12:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/12/cathy-samford-teacher-fired-for- 
unwed-pregnancy_n_1420986.html. 
 2. This provision is known as “the moral clause.” See, e.g., Archdiocese of Washington, 
Policies for Catholic Schools 4 (2009) (stating in Policy 1244, for example, that “[a]ll school 
administrators and all faculty shall adhere to Catholic faith, teaching and moral discipline, and shall 
not contradict the Catholic faith, teaching and moral discipline, and shall not harm communion with 
the Church”).  
 3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2) (2016). As applied to pregnancies or other protected 
characteristics, the moral clauses arguably fall outside the scope of justified religious exemptions. 
See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Ever Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. 
Rev. 781 (2007); Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 
128 Harv. L. Rev. F. 24 (2014); see also infra note 11. Before the amendment of Title VII through the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) in 1978, discrimination against pregnant teachers was 
common and certainly not limited to religious schools. Mostly, however, cases involved married 
teachers and schools reasoned discrimination in efficiency terms rather than moral terms. Few cases 
involved unmarried pregnancies (one before the PDA and two after its enactment), and of those, all 
resulted in judgments that favored the pregnant teachers. See Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorn 
Sch. Dist., 636 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Ponton v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056 
(E.D. Va. 1986); Drake v. Covington Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974). For a 
historical overview, see Susan A. Kidwell, Pregnancy Discrimination in Educational Institutions: A 
Proposal to Amend the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1287 (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., Woodard v. Jupiter Christian Sch., Inc., 913 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(alleging that a gay student was expelled after his teacher confronted him about his sexual 
orientation); Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D. Ky. 2001) 
(discussing action brought by a lesbian therapist dismissed from employment in a Southern Baptist 
home after a picture of her with her girlfriend was exhibited without her knowledge); Complaint at 2–
5, Zmuda v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2014) (No. 14-2-
07007-1), 2014 WL 1377720 (involving a vice principal in a Catholic school alleging he was terminated 
for marrying his partner, and settling without judgment in 2014). 
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contraceptives,5 as well as across a variety of settings spanning 
educational and commercial, private and public, for-profit and not-for-
profit.6 In the wake of the historic Supreme Court decision on marriage 
equality in Obergefell v. Hodges,7 the conflict between religion and 
antidiscrimination is likely to further intensify. The Supreme Court has 
not yet clarified the appropriate balance between religious liberty and 
gender and sexual equality8 (each backed, of course, by statutory and 
constitutional protections9), and Obergefell’s strong affirmation of 
equality alongside a vague reassurance of First Amendment “protection”10 
 
 5. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (noting plaintiffs brought action 
because for-profit businesses refused to provide contraception coverage to their employees due to 
owners’ religious beliefs). 
 6. Some businesses have long sought the right to exclude or deny services to LGBT people 
based on religious reasons. See, e.g., J. Barrett Hyman, M.D. v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 
532 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (rejecting the “hypothetical” claims of a physician who sought the right to 
discriminate against LGBT people in his medical practice and remanding with instructions to dismiss 
without prejudice for lack of standing), vacated, 53 F. App’x 740 (6th Cir. 2002); McClure v. Sports & 
Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a closely held sports club and his 
Evangelical owners discriminated against his employees and customers on the basis of religion, sexual 
identity, and marital status, in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act). These cases multiply as 
gay marriage becomes the norm. Recently in New Mexico, Oregon, Colorado, and Washington, D.C., 
businesses were held liable for discrimination for refusing service to marrying LGBT customers for 
religious reasons. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); Interim 
Order—Ruling on Respondents’ Re-Filed Motion for Summary Judgment and Agency’s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Klein, Nos. 44-14 & 45-14, (Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. Jan. 
29, 2015); Initial Decision Granting Complainants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 2–3, Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., CR 2013-
0008 (Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n Dec. 6, 2013), aff’d Final Agency Order (June 2, 2014). Notably, 
while these cases often involve different areas of law and legal distinctions, religious objectors across 
different settings often raise very similar claims. This similarity, which directly bears on the scope of 
religious conflict, might warrant a more comprehensive legal approach. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva 
Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 
2516, 2544 (2015). The present Article focuses on the context of employment and schools, but 
considers and provides data on the shared bases of the religious response across legal settings. 
 7. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 8. In the only instance where a religion-based pregnancy dismissal reached the Supreme Court, 
it sidestepped the issue, although the Court hinted it had sympathy toward the teacher when 
remanding the case to the local EEOC. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs. Inc., 
477 U.S. 619 (1986). In the same manner, the Court affirmed the ministerial exception in Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), yet expressly limited its 
holding to the facts of the case, where the teacher was a “called” minister who actively led students to 
prayer. Id. at 707–09. The Hobby Lobby holding was also restricted to the facts of the case where a 
ready exemption was available. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783–85.  
 9. The Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII, guarantee gender equality, and over twenty states 
currently guarantee sexual orientation equality. See supra note 3. The First Amendment guarantees 
freedom of association and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2016) affords additional protection from federal restriction of religious freedom. In 1997, 
RFRA was invalidated as applied to states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Over twenty 
states have enacted their own RFRAs. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, Nat’l Conf. 
of St. Legislatures (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-
rfra-legislation.aspx. 
 10. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
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offers more questions than answers. How should courts apply Title VII 
and the many state antidiscrimination laws that prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of gender, pregnancy, and sexual orientation? How should 
courts navigate between different legal outcomes available under their 
discretion? 
Currently, courts’ positions on these cases diverge by a surprisingly 
large margin. Some courts apply antidiscrimination law broadly and 
interpret religious exemptions narrowly,11 whereas other courts take the 
inverse approach.12 Meanwhile, constitutional lawyers and scholars are 
naturally preoccupied with the normative questions that these conflicts 
raise. They debate how society should safeguard gender equality and 
individual freedom to express sexuality, and whether courts should 
confirm or limit religious freedom to condemn and penalize certain 
 
 11. Such “pro-equality” courts apply the law to all religious employers and service providers, 
whether individual, for-profit or non-for-profit. Under this view, Title VII’s religious exemption does 
not allow religious employers to escape liability “for discrimination based on race, color, sex or 
national origin.” Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Iowa 1980). Discrimination 
in hiring and treatment of religious ministers (“the ministerial exception”) is allowed. Courts, 
however, stick to McClure v. Salvation Army, which restricted this exception to the “church-minister 
relationship” and refrained from “any decision as to other church employees.” McClure v. Salvation 
Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972). Therefore, employees who are not ministers (and most are 
not) are not barred from raising discrimination claims. See, e.g., Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South 
Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1177 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (holding that a lay language arts teacher with no 
role in religious education is not a minister); Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251-
SJD, 2013 WL 360355 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013), appeal dismissed, No. 13-3759 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) 
(holding that a computer and technology instructor is not a minister); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of 
Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that firing a school librarian after she became 
pregnant out of wedlock is per se discrimination). Plaintiffs still need to demonstrate that moral 
standards are not neutral as religious respondents argue, but discriminatory as is or as applied. See, 
e.g., Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend Inc., No. 1:12-CV-122 RLM, 2015 WL 1013783, at *2 
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 9, 2015) (providing evidence that three male employees who were thrown out of a 
strip club after harassing one of the performers were reprimanded but not fired); Ganzy v. Allen 
Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344, 359–60 (E.D. N.Y. 1998) (holding that a private sectarian 
institution “has the right to employ only teachers who adhere to the school’s moral code and religious 
tenets,” but a factual determination would be necessary to see if a neutral policy against premarital sex 
may be discriminatory as applied because sexual activities of females are easier to discover); EEOC v. 
Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that providing health insurance 
plans only to men and single women and not to married women is a sex-based discrimination, 
notwithstanding the organization’s belief that a woman cannot be “head of household”). 
 12. Such “pro-religion” courts typically interpret religious exemptions broadly. See, e.g., Little v. 
Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 945 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that “Congress has exempted religious institutions 
from much of Title VII’s prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of religion” and 
rejecting the discrimination claims of a Protestant lay teacher who was dismissed from a Catholic 
school after failing to remarry pursuant to the “proper canonical process”); Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist 
Homes for Children, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757, 762 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (holding that a Christian charity 
did not discriminate against a lesbian therapist in dismissing her after her sexual identity became 
public); see also Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that a communications manager responsible for media releases and community involvement 
is a minister, barring sex and ethnicity discrimination claim); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 805 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the cathedral’s director of music ministry 
and part-time music teacher is a minister, barring sex discrimination claim). 
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preferences and behaviors.13 At the centerpiece of the debate is the question 
of religious accommodations: when should the state accommodate religious 
beliefs and when should it not?14 
These are difficult and important questions, yet they rest on 
empirical assumptions that—notwithstanding the burgeoning literature 
they have generated—remain buried and ignored. This Article uncovers 
these assumptions and examines empirically key questions that they 
currently hide. In so doing, it offers a deeper understanding of religious 
conflicts and the way in which they can be reconciled. 
The first tacit empirical assumption to uncover is that religious 
individuals will inevitably seek to be exempt from antidiscrimination law 
whenever it conflicts with their beliefs.15 This assumption, often turned 
into an explicit argument by religious advocates, has steered the legal 
discourse to focus on the need and demand for religious accommodations 
and exemptions, and on determining their justifiable scope.16 But what if 
 
 13. For further discussion of some of the central debates, see Engaging Cultural Differences: 
The Multicultural Challenge in Liberal Democracies (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds., 2002), 
Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999), and 
Austin Sarat, Legal Responses to Religious Practices in the United States: Accommodation and 
Its Limits (2012). See also Minow, supra note 3. 
 14. See infra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. A parallel philosophical debate focuses on 
whether individuals have a duty to obey the law and under what conditions they should be allowed to 
disobey a law that conflicts with their beliefs. Although the debates are clearly connected, the legal 
discourse on whether states should accommodate moral objections to the law is rarely concerned with 
the core limitations that philosophers placed on such objections. Examples of these considerations 
include the requirement that previous legal efforts to change the law have been made, or that the law 
itself be unjust, or that the act of disobedience would be peaceful, or that the disobedient person 
would be willing to submit to punishment. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and 
Morality 25–30 (1987); Michael Walzer, The Obligation to Disobey, 77 Ethics 163 (1967). 
 15. Professor Marshall first noted this troubling aspect of the accommodations litigation. See 
William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308, 311 
(1991). 
 16. The debate mostly focuses on justifying either the religious interest in accommodation or the 
societal interest in antidiscrimination. Compare Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. 
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (emphasizing the Church’s need to “control over the selection of 
those who will personify its beliefs”), with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 
(2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting the “[c]ompelling governmental interests in uniform 
compliance with the law, and disadvantages that religion-based opt-outs impose on others”). Some 
scholars suggest a balance between antidiscrimination values and religious values. See, e.g., Marie A. 
Failinger, Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian 
Renters and Religious Landlords, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 383 (2001) (proposing to hold religious people 
liable for religion-motivated discrimination but limit damages to strike a balance between competing 
moral outlooks); Stephanie Hammond Knutson, The Religious Landlord and the Conflict Between 
Free Exercise Rights and Housing Discrimination Laws—Which Interest Prevails?, 47 Hastings L.J. 
1669, 1728–30 (1996) (noting difficulty in weighing civil rights interests and religious interests and 
proposing a religious exemption for small landlords); Harlan Loeb & David Rosenberg, Fundamental 
Rights in Conflict: The Price of a Maturing Democracy, 77 N.D. L. Rev. 27 (2001) (suggesting 
individual religious-based exemptions that could be overridden by a state’s compelling interest in 
limited circumstances); Shelley K. Wessels, The Collision of Religious Exercise and Governmental 
Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1201, 1220–21 (1989) (urging protection for religious 
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many (or even most) individuals who find pregnancy out of wedlock 
immoral or object to same-sex marriage do not seek an exemption? 
What if they reconcile their conflicts differently? In this case, both sides 
of the debate must reexamine their positions. Proponents of exemptions17 
must explain why legal accommodations ought to be carved out if the 
tension between faith and law can be mitigated without them. After all, if 
religious liberty is not unduly burdened, then surely the preferred course 
should be to uphold the law equally for all people, religious and 
nonreligious alike. At the same time, opponents of exemptions18 will 
have to explain why these accommodations are truly worrisome if the 
demand for them is small and derives from a religious minority. (Of 
course there is always the question of impact, which I discuss next.) 
A second key question asks what effect accommodations that are 
made today might have on future compliance with the law and on the 
tension between church and state more generally. Current debates often 
allude to the impact of accommodations on civil rights law and 
particularly on third parties.19 Professor Hamilton has long argued that 
accommodations encourage religious “narcissism” and further 
disobedience,20 and Professors NeJaime and Siegel recently argued that 
 
groups when the group looks “inward,” but not when the group “turns outwards” in providing services 
to others). 
 17. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (2014); Chai R. 
Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 61 (2006); Richard 
W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and—and Among—Civil Rights: Separation, Toleration, and 
Accommodation, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 493 (2015); Andrew Hambler, Recognising a Right to 
“Conscientiously Object” for Registrars Whose Religious Beliefs Are Incompatible with Their Duty to 
Conduct Same-Sex Civil Partnerships, 7 Religion & Hum. Rts. 157 (2012); Andrew Koppelman, You 
Can’t Hurry Love—Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious 
Exemptions, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 125 (2006); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 1 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109 (1990); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut 
Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 581 
(1993). 
 18. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: The Perils of Extreme Religious Liberty 
(2014); Alvin C. Lin, Note: Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Laws and the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act: The Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 89 Geo. L.J. 719 (2001) (arguing 
against individual religious-based exemptions because they inject a troubling “morality” inquiry into 
civil rights laws); Marshall, supra note 15. 
 19. See, e.g., Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord’s “Free” Exercise of Religion: Tenant’s 
Right to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 Fordham Urb. L.J. 699 (1995) (arguing against 
religious exemptions from civil rights laws because allowing free exercise claims to trump civil rights 
laws could be the death knell for civil rights). 
 20. Hamilton, supra note 18, at 33, 35 (“In effect, though never explicitly, religious entities have 
been lobbying for the right to hurt others without consequences . . . . The RFRA legislative history is 
filled with paeans to religious liberty, but precious little analysis of what would happen if religious 
individuals and institutions had the power to overcome all laws on a routine basis.”). 
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“religious accommodation may extend, rather than resolve, conflict.”21 
For all of their intensity, these arguments remain largely theoretical, as 
little empirical evidence is brought to support them. The lack of relevant 
data directly bears on the persuasiveness of a compelling state interest in 
not providing accommodations, especially in light of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act’s (“RFRA”) least restrictive means test.22 
An equally important and related question regards the  
behavioral impact of outcomes that are not exemptions—particularly, 
antidiscrimination remedies. The current focus on accommodations shifts 
attention from other possible legal outcomes, but in practice, whenever 
courts decide that the ministerial or other exemption does not bar the 
application of antidiscrimination law, the question of remedies arises. 
Courts typically assume that monetary damages23 offer a “nonintrusive 
remedy,” as the D.C. Circuit once stated, which is best suited for cases of 
religiously based discrimination. In contrast, performance and reinstatement 
are almost never granted or seriously considered for fear of “excessive 
entanglement” due to “court oversight.”24 This doctrine has deep roots in 
contract theory, with its emphasis on the autonomy of the discriminating 
party and the belief that damages provide the fiscal worth of performance, 
 
 21. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2544. 
 22. Under RFRA, the government has to pass two tests to burden the free exercise of religion: it 
must show a compelling interest justifying the burden and that the least restrictive means was chosen 
to advance this interest. The Hobby Lobby decision demonstrated that direct evidence on the impact 
of accommodations could be crucial to pass these tests. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751, 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, she cites several studies showing 
that contraceptives have a positive impact on women’s participation in the workforce but no study on 
the extent to which religious accommodations would actually reduce workforce participation or access 
to contraceptives. Id. at 2789. At the same time, the majority opinion heavily relied on the lack of 
evidence regarding such disparate impact to establish that Hobby Lobby’s beliefs should be 
accommodated. While relevant studies might not have existed at the time of the judgment, these 
opinions demonstrate the need for direct, relevant evidence on the projected impact of 
accommodations. 
 23. Throughout this Article, I use “damages” as a general term for monetary awards, focusing in 
Part II.E on compensatory and punitive damages. Payments may also include compensations for 
emotional pain and suffering and so on. 
 24. Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). Though the notion of “entanglement” might seem unique to the First Amendment 
context, the preference of damages over performance is not necessarily unique to antidiscrimination 
law or to religion-based conflicts. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 757, § 12.8 
(2004) (“The award of damages is the common form of relief for breach of contract.”); Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Can’t Buy Me Love: Monetary Versus In-Kind Remedies, U. Ill. L. Rev. 151 (2013) 
(criticizing the reliance on damages instead of specific performance in various areas of law); Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1003 (2010) (criticizing 
the doctrine with evidence on commonsense perceptions on the morality of breach). In environmental 
law, see Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common 
Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1 (pondering over the ramifications of a legal regime based on payment in 
lieu of performance). 
Barak_Corren_21 (Hamilton).doc (Do Not Delete) 5/10/2016 4:15 PM 
May 2016]        BEHAVIOR, RELIGION, AND DISCRIMINATION 965 
resolving the need of oversight.25 Yet, this doctrine is also fundamentally at 
odds with general antidiscrimination doctrine, which prefers reinstatement 
when feasible and views damages as complementary or substitute.26 Indeed, 
against this background damages in lieu of reinstatement can be best 
understood as a form of religious accommodation. But whether damages 
are actually more religiously acceptable than reinstatement is unclear,27 
and the behavioral impact of damages versus reinstatement is therefore 
an important question. The societal interest in promoting equality 
through antidiscrimination law requires effective enforcement that can 
correct the outcomes of discrimination and discourage further civil rights 
violations. The behavioral impact of each legal outcome must be studied 
if we are to understand whether one outcome promotes these goals 
better than the other. 
Lacking answers to these empirical questions, antidiscrimination law 
proceeds to tackle religious conflicts on dubious footing, exposing the 
very individuals it is supposed to protect to potentially severe ramifications 
without sufficient justification. Religious objection and deviance from 
antidiscrimination law is not an inevitable outcome and should not be 
assumed or implied. While some aspects of religious doctrine may bring 
people into direct conflict with the law, other aspects—particularly those 
emphasizing compassion, mercy, humility, love, and support—may converge 
with antidiscrimination law on the outcome, if not the contested norm.28 
And while religious objection cases are certainly salient, the image of 
widespread nonadherence could be the result of a selection bias.29 Such 
 
 25. Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution § 12.21(4) (1993) 
(explaining that the general rule with respect to breach of employment contracts “leaves the employee 
to a claim for damages or restitution”); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 
92 Yale L.J. 763, 778–79 (1983); James E. Penner, Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of 
Contract, 2 Legal Theory 325 (1996) (cautioning that specific performance may interfere with 
personal freedom). 
 26. See Johnson v. Chapel Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 853 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Ann-Marie 
C. Carstens, Note, The Front Pay Niche: Reinstatement’s Alter Ego Is Equitable Relief for Sex 
Discrimination Victims, 88 Geo. L.J. 299 (2000) (listing cases extensively). 
 27. The preference of damages over reinstatement is an open debate for additional reasons, such 
as the question whether damages succeed in fully compensating injured parties. See Paul G. Mahoney, 
Contract Remedies: General, in Encyclopedia of Law & Economics 117 (Bouckaert & De Geest eds., 
2000); Thomas Ulen, Specific Performance, 3 New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics 481 
(Newman ed., 1998); Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 24. The argument that damages better 
preserve the parties’ autonomy is also debatable. An internal critique points to autonomy as the 
reason to hold people to their ex-ante commitments rather than to free them from these commitments. 
See, e.g., Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (2015). An 
external critique asks why the autonomy of the injuring party—particularly religious groups—should 
be preferred over the rights and interests of the injured party. I draw here primarily on Susan Moller 
Okin’s canonical challenge of multiculturalism. Okin, supra note 13. 
 28. See infra Part II.C. 
 29. Put in simple terms, the only cases that ascend the judicial ladder are those that feature 
religious individuals who argue against the law, while religious individuals who obey the law have no 
reason to engage in litigation, and indeed, they rarely do. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin 
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bias could mask the actual frequency of compliance with 
antidiscrimination law and prevent the motivations and modes of 
reasoning of religious law-abiders from reaching the courts and public 
attention. Selection bias could also obscure the broader question of which 
factors impact decisionmaking in conflicts between antidiscrimination law 
and religious convictions.30 
To understand the impact of antidiscrimination law on religious 
behavior, this Article goes beyond the biased sample of cases that reach 
the courts to look at how a general religious population reacts to the law, 
as well as to alternative legal means of enforcement.31 To date, there has 
been almost no attempt to research these questions. I draw on two 
decision experiments with over 3500 religious individuals and in-depth 
interviews with senior religious managers to empirically simulate and 
examine religious decisionmaking at two important junctions: first, at the 
outset of conflict, before any litigation takes place, and second, in the 
aftermath of litigation. This design allows me to carefully examine 
religious objection before and after judicial intervention and explore how 
different legal outcomes and fairness in court proceedings impact religious 
decisionmaking in further instances of conflict. 
While this project is informed and influenced by the traditional 
constitutional analysis of the conflict as a clash between religious values on 
one side and liberal values on the other, my approach is fundamentally 
different. Rather than assuming that civic values are foreign to a faith-
based perspective and that law and religion only meet in court, I examine 
how normative conflicts are perceived and handled by religious individuals. 
My data reveals that the conflict of values is internal to religion, in that it is 
found across all religious denominations and levels of practice. Two 
competing religious approaches appear to be at play: a “firm hand” 
approach that emphasizes religious prohibitions and is likely to cause 
tension with antidiscrimination law, and a “kind heart” approach that 
emphasizes religious compassion and substantially reduces conflict with 
antidiscrimination law. I subsequently find that most religious individuals 
 
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984) (reviewing the relationship 
between litigated versus settled discrimination disputes); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, 
Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 24 Law & Soc’y Rev. 1133 (1990). 
 30. Such concerns have been raised, but have not been empirically addressed. See Hamilton, 
supra note 18; Okin, supra note 13; Marshall, supra note 15, at 312. 
 31. On overcoming selection bias by studying everyday people and their interactions with the law, 
see the highly influential work of Susan S. Silbey & Patricia Ewick, The Common Place of Law: 
Stories from Everyday Life (1998); Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Narrating Social Structure: Stories 
of Resistance to Legal Authority, 108 Am. J. of Soc. 1328 (2003); see also Idit Kostiner, Evaluating 
Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social Change, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 
323 (2003). 
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are not inclined to defy the law, even as they believe the behavior 
protected by antidiscrimination law to be religiously forbidden. 
I also find that religious decisionmaking in conflicts between 
antidiscrimination law and religious doctrine is significantly shaped by 
the legal response to these conflicts. I find that even religious participants 
disposed to defy antidiscrimination law are more likely to comply after 
they learn what outcomes antidiscrimination law dictates. Contrary to 
prevailing expectations, they are particularly more likely to do so after an 
order of reinstatement than after a damages award or even a punitive 
damages award, and they do not appear to find reinstatement less 
acceptable than damages. This effect appears to be attributable to the 
different meanings people construe of alternative legal sanctions: while 
damages are interpreted to mean that antidiscrimination values can be 
legally traded for money, reinstatement is interpreted as affirmation of 
antidiscrimination values and their binding power. Strikingly, punitive 
damages fare worse than both reinstatement and compensatory damages. 
Their higher cost is not translated into higher deterrence. Instead, they 
backlash, lowering intentions to obey the court and raising intentions to 
resist the law in future conflicts with religion. Based on these findings, I 
challenge the existing doctrine regarding religion and antidiscrimination, 
and I discuss potential implications for the design of religious 
accommodations. 
Now that the cornerstones for the discussion are in place, this 
Article proceeds with Part I to present the theoretical background for 
this Article, which is grounded in the literature on why people follow the 
law or disobey it. Part II empirically applies the theory to the conflict 
between antidiscrimination law and competing religious norms. Lastly, 
Part III discusses the implications of my findings. 
I.  Why Do People Follow Laws: Outcomes, Process, or Norms? 
To assess why people follow or do not follow antidiscrimination law 
that conflicts with religious convictions, one must first examine why 
people follow the law in general. Several different explanations exist. 
Economic analysis theory emphasizes the role of outcomes in 
decisionmaking and argues that people adhere to the law only to the 
extent they find it beneficial.32 In contrast, procedural fairness theory 
argues that costs and benefits are secondary to what really guides people, 
which is the fairness of the procedures by which outcomes are decided. If 
legal authorities—legislatures, governments, and courts—operate 
 
 32. Nuno Garoupa, Criminal Law and Economics (2009); Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and 
the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232 (1985) [hereinafter 
Shavell, Criminal Law]; Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 Am. L. & 
Econ. Rev. 227 (2002) [hereinafter Shavell, Law Versus Morality]. 
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according to fair procedures, people will be inclined to obey the 
outcomes of these procedures even when they bear costs rather than 
benefits.33 A third theory suggests that people internalize the values that 
the law institutionalizes and follow them not for the cost of law or the 
process by which it was enacted, but out of a sense of moral commitment, 
if not to the specific value protected under the law then to the normative 
system as a whole.34 
Clearly, no one model can explain behavior for all people, 
situations, and times; rather, each of these models has some predictive 
power in some circumstances.35 Furthermore, it is almost impossible to 
extricate the incentivizing aspects of the law or its procedural aspects 
from its normative aspects. In Part I.A, I lay out the basics of the economic 
analysis theory and point to two ways in which norms complicate this 
analysis. First, many people consider some values sacred and beyond any 
cost-benefit analysis. Second, when values are the central motivators of 
behavior, monetary incentives may crowd out compliance by making 
normative commitments seem like simple trade-offs. In Part I.B, I lay out 
the theory that procedural fairness motivates compliance by bringing 
people to associate just procedures with just laws. I point to the challenge 
of doing so when the justifications for the law are questioned by a value 
system as entrenched as religious morality. Two questions emerge from 
the discussion. First, might monetary remedies such as damages erode 
legal commitment, and could performance requirements such as 
reinstatement reinforce it? Second, can procedural fairness encourage 
adherence to laws that conflict with religious beliefs? These questions are 
then studied and answered in Part II. 
A. Compliance with the Law: A Question of Costs or Norms? 
The most pervasive approach to analyzing behavior in legal writing 
is the economic analysis of law, according to which the individual is a 
rational maximizer who makes decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
 33. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views 
and the Criminal Law (1995); Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 57–60 (2d ed. 1990) 
[hereinafter Tyler, Why People Obey]; Tom R. Tyler, Psychology and the Design of Legal 
Institutions 11–13 (2007) [hereinafter Tyler, Legal Design]. 
 34. Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a 
Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 Law & Soc’y Rev. 549 (1996); Robinson & Darley, 
supra note 33; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453 
(1997). Lastly, people may also follow the law without questioning its value, process, or moral weight, 
simply out of conformity to others. This approach is beyond the scope of the present Article. See 
generally Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity, 55 
Ann. Rev. Psychol. 591 (2004) (studying influence on social forces as a psychological phenomenon 
related to conformity and compliance). 
 35. Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and 
Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 325 (1980). 
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This theory assumes that each individual has a utility function reflecting 
her preferences, desires, and personal taste—a function that the 
individual seeks to maximize. To decide whether to obey a particular 
law, the individual assesses the benefits (material or other) and costs 
(shame, stigma, incarceration, fine, and so on) she is expected to incur as 
a result of compliance or noncompliance, and she weighs them against 
each other.36 Economists assume that as long as the legal system provides 
sufficient (dis)incentives, individuals will obey the law.37 Importantly, any 
incentive structure depends not only on its magnitude but also on the 
probability of its application, since a high penalty has zero value if it is 
never enforced (at least in economic terms).38 
The assumption that people engage in a rational calculus has been 
roundly criticized in recent years by behavioral scientists.39 For our 
purposes it is sufficient to point out that no one disputes that legal 
sanctions, whether monetary or nonmonetary, are likely to play a 
deterring role. Indeed, people do not exhibit “perfect” rationality in their 
cost-benefit analyses,40 but their behavior nonetheless reflects the 
tremendous impact of economic considerations. Abundant studies have 
demonstrated that many people willfully break rules when it benefits 
them to do so, and that social sanctions alter payoff structures and reduce 
antisocial behavior.41 This influence, however, deviates in predictable ways 
from neoclassical economic predictions. To name a couple, people are 
more heavily influenced by the probability of enforcement than the 
severity of the sanction,42 and they observe reality through a screen of 
self-serving biases and are overly optimistic that they will not be caught.43 
 
 36. Becker, supra note 32. 
 37. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 
Handbook of Law and Economics 405 (Polinsky & Shavell eds., 2007); Steven Shavell, Economic 
Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law, in Foundations of Economic Analysis of 
Law (2004). 
 38. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37; Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Effects of 
the Perceived Risk of Arrest: Testing an Expanded Conception of Deterrence, 29 Criminology 561 (1991). 
 39. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1471 (1998); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded 
Rationality, 58 Am. Psychologist 697 (2003). 
 40. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1113–19 (2000); see also 
Jolls et al., supra note 39, at 1538; Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Law and 
Economics, Crim. L. & Econ. 403, 415, 417 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009) (discussing similar findings with 
respect to criminal law); Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, 
(Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 494, Sept. 2004). 
 41. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 Evolution 
& Hum. Behav. 63 (2004); Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis, Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: 
Experimental and Analytical Foundations, 33 Ann. Rev. Soc. 43 (2007) (describing evidence that many 
individuals do not cooperate if no punishment mechanisms are operative and that individual self-
interest largely dominates behavior in lab experiments). 
 42. This violates Becker’s equal weight assumption. See Becker, supra note 32; see also Raymond 
Paternoster, Decisions to Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Common Delinquency: 
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More central to our topic is the manner in which norms and 
identities challenge the economic analysis model. From an economic 
perspective, norms are typically conceptualized as external incentives 
that motivate or discourage behavior through shame, pride, stigma, 
spiritual uplifting, and so on.44 In this model, individuals comply with 
norms (legal or religious) based on whether these norms maximize 
personal utility. From yet another economic perspective, norms can be 
thought of as internal preferences that shape how people value different 
outcomes.45 For example, differing normative commitments (such as early 
wake ups on the weekend) would make church attendance extremely 
costly to one individual but a significant source of gain (spiritual, social, 
or other) to another. 
The external and internal economic accounts of norms appear 
reductive to many. They also do not grasp some of the primary 
mechanisms through which norms and laws impact behavior. People 
follow norms and laws even when they derive no apparent benefit as a 
result—not even nonmaterial gains such as reputation or meaningful 
relationships.46 Two examples are particularly relevant. The first is sacred 
values. Ample evidence demonstrates that for many people, some values 
are considered beyond any cost-benefit analysis. People do not calculate 
the price of honor, responsibility, or loyalty. They resist opportunities to 
trade these values for money or other concrete utilities, and they also 
condemn and punish others who attempt to commit such trade-offs.47 
 
Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspectives, 23 Law & Soc’y Rev. 7 (1989); Daniel S. Nagin & 
Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive Effects of the Perceived Risk of Arrest: Testing an Expanded 
Conception of Deterrence, 29 Criminology 561 (1991); Raymond Paternoster & Leeann Iovanni, The 
Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity: A Reexamination, 64 Soc. Forces 751 (1986). 
 43. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science 
Investigation, 24 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 173 (2004). 
 44. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and 
Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System, 115 J. Pol. Econ. 494 (2007) (examining how 
a “social planner” would associate moral feelings with acts to induce behavior fostering social 
welfare); Shavell, Law Versus Morality, supra note 31 (examining the various intersecting roles of law 
and morality in controlling behavior).  
 45. Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes 225 (1996) (“Norms are those common values of a 
group which influence an individual’s behavior through being internalized as preferences.”). The idea 
was expanded and formulated in George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Economics and Identity, Q.J. 
Econ. 715 (2000); George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 
19 J. Econ. Persp. 9 (2005). 
 46. For a helpful review of the research, see L. Stout, Cultivating Conscience (2010). See also 
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585 (1998); Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note 40 (critiquing shortcomings of rational analysis in this regard); Cass R. Sunstein, Social 
Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903 (1996). 
 47. See Jonathan Baron & Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70 Organizational Behav. & Hum. 
Decision Processes 1 (1997); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The 
Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. Risk & Uncertainty 1 (1998); Robert J. MacCoun, The Costs 
and Benefits of Letting Juries Punish Corporations: Comment on Viscusi, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1821 (2000); 
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This behavior is antithetical to the economic concept of norms. Using the 
words of moral psychologist Philip Tetlock, “[o]ur commitments to other 
people require us to deny that certain things are comparable. Even to 
contemplate attaching a finite monetary value to one’s friendships, 
children, or loyalty to one’s country is to disqualify oneself from 
membership in the associated moral community.”48 
The general aversion for valuating sacred norms in economic terms 
may also serve to avert the influence of economic incentives in normative 
contexts.49 Under standard economic analysis, incentives should either 
yield the expected behavioral change or leave behavior intact. But 
incentives can also backfire. Payment can reduce the propensity for 
volunteering or donating blood50 and fines can increase the propensity for 
being late to pick up one’s children from daycare.51 In contexts where 
virtues, care, and love are the central motivators of behavior, monetary 
incentives “crowd out” desirable behavior by making normative 
commitments seem like crude trade-offs. Hence, there is more to 
incentives than their sheer value: they convey messages about the norms 
to which they are linked. Attaching fiscal value to norms reduces their 
behavioral impact by eroding legal commitment. 
Scholars have long emphasized that the law has an expressive 
function beyond its coercive function.52 It signals that certain actions are 
wrong and other actions are permissible,53 and these normative messages 
alter values, norms, and behavior. Some data indicates that laws that 
challenge moral convictions might even cause people to adjust their 
values to reduce the cognitive dissonance between the law and their 
moral beliefs.54 The research on how laws—and sanctions—influence 
 
Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions, 7 Trends 
Cognitive Sci. 320 (2003). 
 48. See Tetlock, supra note 47, at 321; Alan P. Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: 
Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 Pol. Psychol. 255 (1997); Philip E. 
Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and 
Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 853 (2000) (reporting denial and moral 
cleansing among Christian fundamentalists exposed to heretical counterfactuals). 
 49. Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds out Civic Virtues, 107 Econ. J. 1043 (1997); 
Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. Econ. Surv. 589 (2001). 
 50. Frey, supra note 49; Frey & Jegen, supra note 49 . 
 51. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1, 3 (2000). 
 52. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1690–91 
(2000); Sunstein, supra note 46, at 910; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2022 (1996). 
 53. Maynard L. Erickson et al., The Normative Erosion Hypothesis: The Latent Consequences of 
Juvenile Justice Practices, 25 Soc. Q. 373, 374 (1984); Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A 
Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition, 113 Psychol. Bull. 497, 498 (1993). 
 54. See Leonard Berkowitz & Nigel Walker, Laws and Moral Judgments, 30 Sociometry 410, 413 
(1967) (describing an experiment that surveyed participants on the morality of various behaviors and 
then informed them on “laws recently enacted” that either prescribed or proscribed these behaviors; 
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intrinsic normative commitments yields intriguing questions regarding 
conflicts between law and religion. Might monetary sanctions erode legal 
commitments? Can upholding the law—for example, with performance 
sanctions—strengthen these commitments? 
Part II.C presents novel empirical data that answers these questions. 
It also provides data on the second model that seeks to explain adherence 
to the law—to which I shall turn now. 
B. Compliance with the Law: A Question of Procedure or 
Content? 
Can the quality of legal processes—in particular, their fairness—
impact decisions in conflicts between law and religion? Based on the vast 
literature on procedural fairness, the answer should be affirmative. 
In contrast to economic theory, the procedural fairness theory 
argues that costs and benefits are secondary to what really guides 
people—the morality of the law and the fairness of the procedures by 
which laws are enacted and legal decisions are made. In a series of 
influential works, legal psychologists Tyler, Darley, and their colleagues 
argue that compliance is mostly not a function of legal or social 
sanctions, but rather of an internal “feeling of obligation or responsibility 
to act appropriately.”55 Such internal obligation reflects the extent to 
which the law is perceived as legitimate,56 and when legitimacy exists, 
individuals are willing to suspend their personal judgment and defer to 
the judgment of the lawmaker, believing that the law is entitled to 
determine standards for behavior.57 
What motivates people to accept the law or defer to the judgment of 
legal authorities? Early processes of socialization and education, legal 
culture, and direct assessments of the morality of the law are clearly 
formative. Yet psychologists discovered that legitimacy judgments also 
hinge on factors other than direct assessments of the authority—factors 
to which they refer as the determinants of procedural fairness.58 
 
no information was provided on possible sanctions and people significantly adjusted their views in the 
legal direction); see also Sunstein, supra note 52. 
 55. Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About 
Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 
Hofstra L. Rev. 707, 714 (2000). 
 56. Tyler, Legal Design, supra note 33, at 22–23 (defining legitimacy as “a quality possessed by 
an authority, a law, or an institution that leads others to feel obligated to accept its directives”). 
 57. Id.; Herbert C. Kelman & V. Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social 
Psychology of Authority and Responsibility (1989). 
 58. See E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988); 
Tyler, Legal Design, supra note 33; Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice 
and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 513 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, 
What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 
22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 103 (1988). 
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“Fairness” in this context encompasses several different concerns about 
justice and equity.59 Its first psychological determinant is trust in the 
authorities’ motives and intentions.60 The second is believing that 
authorities act and promulgate laws based on nonbiased, neutral 
consideration of the facts.61 The third is feeling that the authorities treat 
individuals with dignity and respect.62 The more individuals feel that legal 
authorities demonstrate these procedural qualities,63 the more they 
perceive them as legitimate, and the more they are willing to accept and 
follow the law as applied to their cases. Many studies demonstrate that 
fairness concerns often trump outcome concerns. For example, 
participants in various economic games are willing to incur personal costs 
to reject outcomes that they believe have been achieved through unfair 
procedures.64 A host of surveys report that people evaluate their legal 
interactions based on whether they perceive the courts that presided in 
their cases as procedurally fair, and that the fairness impact is greater 
than the impact of the outcomes of the proceedings, be they favorable or 
unfavorable.65 
Clearly, procedural fairness is not the only way by which people 
come to feel obligated to social institutions and norms. People also seek 
“to behave in accord with one’s sense of what is appropriate and right to 
do in a given situation”—their moral values.66 Quite often, morality 
drives individuals’ behavior, irrespective of legality. For instance, when 
individuals refrain from punching someone who insulted them, they do 
so because they perceive this act as “morally wrong,” regardless of its 
legality. Conversely, when they do punch the insulter, they often do so 
because they feel she “deserves it,” again irrespective of the law. Laws 
that do not rest on clear moral grounds—like traffic laws, substance 
abuse laws—are frequently violated, at least partially because people see 
 
 59. This Article follows the body of literature on procedural fairness, particularly pertinent to 
compliance decisions. Yet fairness can also be a direct attribute of the outcomes, as a matter of 
distributive justice. For a meta-analysis comparing the impact of procedural fairness, distributive 
fairness, and outcome favorability, see generally Linda J. Skitka et al., Are Outcome Fairness and 
Outcome Favorability Distinguishable Psychological Constructs? A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 Soc. 
Just. Res. 309 (2003). 
 60. Yuen J. Huo et al., Superordinate Identification, Subgroup Identification, and Justice 
Concerns: Is Separatism the Problem; Is Assimilation the Answer?, 7 Psychol. Sci. 40, 40 (1996); Tom 
R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 
Law & Soc. Inquiry 983, 991 (2006) [hereinafter Tyler, Multiculturalism]. 
 61. Huo et al., supra note 60, at 40; Tyler, Multiculturalism, supra note 60, at 991. 
 62. Huo et al., supra note 60, at 40; Tyler, Multiculturalism, supra note 60, at 991. 
 63. These perceptions need not be based on firsthand experience, but can also be shaped by the 
media and informal reports of others. See Tyler, Psychology, supra note 33, at 35; Tyler, 
Multiculturalism, supra note 60, at 990. 
 64. For a helpful review, see Stout, supra note 46.  
 65. Tyler, Why People Obey, supra note 33; Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: 
Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (2002). 
 66. Tyler, Legal Design, supra note 33, at 27. 
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no wrong in breaching them.67 Not surprisingly, the evidence shows that 
people are more willing to comply with laws that are congruent with their 
moral values.68 They also rate morality as the chief reason for 
compliance—far above legitimacy and the risk of detection.69 
Like assessments of legitimacy, assessments of morality denote an 
internal feeling of responsibility to follow the law. But unlike assessments 
of legitimacy, assessments of morality pertain to the substantive content of 
the law, rather than the characteristics of its authority.70 Tyler and his 
colleagues do not explore factors that directly influence perceptions of 
morality in relation to the law, noting that such perceptions are usually 
traced to early childhood.71 However, fully aware that compliance that 
hinges on moral congruency might be limited to morally congruent 
laws,72 they argue that procedural fairness not only renders the law more 
legitimate, but also promotes the view that the law is congruent with 
one’s morality. In Tyler’s words: “[P]eople’s views about the morality of 
rules are responsive to procedural justice. If legal authorities make 
decisions and implement rules following fair procedures . . . people are 
more likely to view the law as consistent with their own moral values.”73 
The mechanism at work here is individuals’ association of the quality of 
the treatment they receive with the appropriateness of the law—the 
treatment reflects back on the law and establishes it as moral.74 
Furthermore,  
procedural justice judgments . . . shape the reactions of those who are 
on the losing side of cases. If the person who does not receive an 
outcome that they think is favorable or fair feels that the outcome was 
arrived at in a fair way, they are more likely to accept it.75  
Therefore, procedural fairness not only impacts perceptions of morality 
and legitimacy, it also mitigates utility considerations. 
Should these striking findings hold true for situations where laws are 
not only inconsistent with moral values but also conflict with deep-seated 
 
 67. Tyler & Darley, supra note 55, at 716–19. 
 68. Robinson & Darley, supra note 33; Tyler, Why People Obey, supra note 33, at 33–35; Tyler, 
Legal Design, supra note 33, at 29. 
 69. Tyler, Why People Obey, supra note 33; Tyler, Psychology, supra note 33, at 31 
(summarizing the results of Tyler’s 1990 study). 
 70. Tyler, Legal Design, supra note 33, at 29. 
 71. Tyler & Darley, supra note 55, at 718 (citing developmental psychologists). In later work 
Tyler and his collaborators omit most references to moral congruence even where it is clearly relevant, 
as in public perceptions of Supreme Court decisions on abortions. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory 
Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States 
Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 Duke L.J. 703, 743 (1994). 
 72. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 33, at 202 (making this argument with respect to 
discrepancies between law and morality). 
 73. Tyler, Legal Design, supra note 33, at 36. 
 74. Id. at 37. 
 75. Id. at 39. 
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values (and beliefs and norms), they give us cause for optimism about 
mitigating tensions between law and religion. If legal authorities keep 
legal proceedings fair, benevolent, neutral, and respectful, people will be 
more willing to defer to laws they would otherwise perceive to be 
incongruent with their beliefs and social tension will decrease. In 
addition, if procedural fairness is a key to adherence, perhaps the role of 
accommodations has been overstated in the literature.76 
The prospect of encouraging compliance through procedural 
fairness is particularly appealing considering that conflicts between law 
and religion involve, in addition to divergent normative standards, a 
significant legitimacy gap. Whereas the legitimacy of legal authorities 
and the law itself is always debatable, religious commandments and 
commitments are inherently legitimate—if not sacred—from the perspective 
of their adherents. How does procedural fairness fare then, compared to 
and in conjunction with legal outcomes and moral values? The question 
becomes pressing when law’s normativity is at odds with people’s normative 
commitments, destabilizing and perhaps suspending their internal 
commitment to the law. This is the focus of the next Part. 
II.   Decisionmaking Under Conflict: Qualitative and  
Experimental Evidence 
The following presents first-of-its-kind qualitative and experimental 
data on how people perceive and resolve conflicts between their religious 
and legal commitments. The data provides both theoretical 
understandings and practical lessons, but they also consist of multiple 
layers and methodologies that might occasionally be difficult to digest. 
The following paragraphs outline the main findings and provide a 
roadmap for the rest of the Part.  
I begin with an explanation of my methodology in Part II.A—how I 
interviewed religious managers to learn about their conflicts and how I 
designed and collected data for the decisionmaking experiments presented 
here. I proceed to present my analysis of the interview data in three parts. 
First, I analyze how religious managers view conflicts between 
antidiscrimination law and religion—what instances they refer to and what 
they emphasize about them. I find four elements that tie the majority of 
conflicts together and argue, in Part II.B, that a conflict is made of (1) a 
claim for autonomy, (2) which centers on the regulation of people other 
than the religious objector, (3) for engaging in a religiously proscribed 
behavior which is protected by antidiscrimination law, (4) typically 
involving sex and sexuality. I acknowledge this unifying structure to 
clarify the scope of conflicts relevant to this Article and the possible reach 
of the empirical conclusions. 
 
 76. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
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Second, I shed light on how religious managers handle conflicts at 
the religious (not legal) level, namely what they do in the face of 
behavior that is at odds with religious norms. In Part II.C, I identify two 
dominant (religious) approaches to such conflict: a “firm hand,” which 
seeks to exclude the moral offender, versus a “kind heart,” which seeks 
to include the moral offender. I show that both approaches lean on 
religious values and reasoning, yet the latter largely avoids conflict with 
antidiscrimination law. This phenomenon will help explain the findings 
of the experiments later on. 
In Part II.D, this Article turns the focus from the religious to the 
legal realm and shows that, when conflicts reach the court, religious 
managers are willing to pay for their normative autonomy and seek 
financial settlements to avoid complying with substantive 
antidiscrimination obligations. This raises an intriguing—and troubling—
question: can damages really reconcile conflicts between law and religion 
or do they erode the normative and instructive weight of the law? 
Two experiments in Part II.E test this question and the additional 
role that procedural fairness might have in shaping the answer. 
Experiment One examines a sample of 1300 American Christians for 
how damages versus reinstatement, ordered by a standard versus 
particularly fair court, influence the decision to adhere to antidiscrimination 
law. I find that outcome and procedural fairness exert no direct impact 
on obedience to the court decision, but damages engender substantially 
lower adherence to the law than reinstatement. I argue that this result is 
due to the normative message conveyed by each outcome. While a 
monetary award signals that the law can be traded off, reinstatement 
upholds the law’s normativity. I further demonstrate with data how a 
judgment of reinstatement serves as a teaching moment that moves some 
individuals from the “firm hand” approach to the “kind heart” approach. 
In Experiment Two, I replicate and expand these results. I show 
how decisionmaking is produced by religiosity, religious affiliation, and 
pertinent religious beliefs. I show that the advantage of reinstatement 
over damages holds for punitive damages. I further advise against 
punitive damages, as the data show that they reduce obedience to the 
court and reduce support in the rule of law and democracy. This is the 
thrust of my empirical argument, which I will now establish and support 
with the data. 
A. Methodology 
How can we examine the impact of a fair court or a strict sanction 
on behavior? Multiple empirical methodologies exist and each has its 
own benefits and limitations. As others have expansively discussed, 
diverse methodologies should be pursued to triangulate social science 
problems and maximize external validity (the ability to draw inferences 
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from the research to real world settings).77 The complexity of normative 
conflicts between religion and law in particular requires mixed methods 
research. Firstly, obtaining conclusive information on decision processes 
pertaining to discrimination and civil rights disputes is very difficult,78 
particularly for decisions made in relatively insular and intimate settings 
like religious organizations. In addition, many discrimination disputes do 
not even reach the courts, rendering a systematic empirical study of court 
decisions unsatisfactory for the purposes of studying decisionmaking in 
these conflicts. While in-depth interviews may provide rich observation 
of the motivations and experience of religious decisionmakers, the result 
does not often lend itself to generalization and causal inference. The 
golden method to answer questions of causality is to conduct field 
experiments, but in the present case, serious ethical concerns advise 
against such experimentation.79 
In light of the above, experiments outside the field (for example, lab 
or web-based studies) offer a fruitful alternative; they avoid the ethical 
concerns of a field experiment while sharing some of the key advantages, 
namely the ability to determine causality and provide the basis for 
generalizations (on condition that they use sufficiently large samples 
drawn from populations relevant to the questions asked).80 They are also 
capable of capturing real time decisions and control for important 
variables of interest. Their main drawback is that they usually present 
only a rough sketch of the situation and are criticized for lacking realism. 
This Article introduces a methodology that takes advantage of both 
qualitative and quantitative experimental methods in an effort to deal 
with many of the problems outlined above. While each method has its 
pitfalls, they complement each other to construct a rich portrait of 
decisionmaking under normative conflicts between law and religion. I use 
this approach to make several empirical and theoretical contributions. 
 
 77. John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches (2013). 
 78. For a legally oriented review and analysis, see Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of 
Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 969, 992 (2006); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, 
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 
94 Calif. L. Rev. 997, 1057 (2006). 
 79. Imagine that litigants were randomized to receive different sanctions and procedures, 
reinstatement or damages, fair or unfair, based on study needs rather than merit and equality. 
Randomization is the one absolutely necessary requirement underlying any field experiment, yet it 
would deem an arbitrary application of the law per the individuals involved. It would therefore fail any 
ethical board review. This is not to undermine or advise against the use of field experiments in law in 
other contexts; the particular problem lies in experimenting with court outcomes, not in the very idea 
of experiment. 
 80. Dan Kahan, What’s a “Valid” Sample? Problems with Mechanical Turk Study Samples, Part 1, 
Cultural Cognition Project Yale L. Sch. (July 8, 2013, 9:34 AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/ 
blog/2013/7/8/whats-a-valid-sample-problems-with-mechanical-turk-study-sam.html. 
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My methodological approach is twofold. First, in-depth interviews 
were conducted with a diverse set of religious decisionmakers to 
understand the range of conflicts they experience and how these are 
handled in practice.81 The sample was recruited using the snowball 
method82 and consisted of seventeen religious school managers: 
principals, presidents, superintendents, and education administrators 
from across the United States, primarily from New England, the 
Midwest, the South, and the West Mountain region, all of whom are 
Catholic. The interview data produced over twenty hours of audio and 
400 pages of transcripts, which were then coded and analyzed using the 
grounded theory approach.83 Additional data was collected from relevant 
websites, public documents, and Christian media and forums. 
Secondly, a decisionmaking experiment was designed, focused, 
grounded, and animated on the basis of the main trends revealed in the 
qualitative analysis. In particular, the interview data revealed that 
conflicts regarding sexual norms are among the primary tensions that 
preoccupy religious educators (often to their stated dismay), and that the 
dilemmas typically involve a choice between tolerating violations of 
religious doctrine (for example, out-of-wedlock pregnancy or gay 
marriage) and taking adverse action against the “perpetrators” (usually 
by terminating their employment). In short, these were dilemmas 
between enforcing religious doctrine and refraining from doing so. I 
therefore focused the experiment on a scenario that involved all of these 
elements: sexuality, religious doctrine, antidiscrimination law, and 
questions regarding the application of religious doctrine and the fear of 
condoning its violation. These elements were embodied in the 
paradigmatic scenario of a teacher who becomes pregnant out of wedlock. 
The vignette and all other materials used were designed based on 
the detailed descriptions of the religious educators, producing highly 
realistic and culturally precise decisionmaking dilemmas. To ensure 
cultural appropriateness and maximize external validity, the experiments 
were reviewed by multiple religious individuals and administered by a 
large national survey company,84 and only individuals identifying as 
 
 81. Interview transcripts are on file with the author who assumes full responsibility for cites. 
 82. The snowball method is a common technique used to gain access and study insular 
populations. The sensitivity of the issues discussed (which included details on potential breaches of 
law) and the rank of the targeted pool of interviewees required the use of snowball sampling. Prior to 
that, several attempts were made to recruit religious managers on a broad basis through publicly 
available contact information, to no avail. See Patrick Biernacki & Dan Waldorf, Snowball Sampling: 
Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling, 10 Soc. Methods & Res. 141, 152 (1981). 
 83. Barney G. Glaser & Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies 
for Qualitative Research (1967). 
 84. That company is Survey Sampling International, Inc. See Kahan, supra note 80 on the 
inappropriateness of the conventional online labor markets (for example, Amazon Mechanical Turk) 
for a study that seeks to examine conservative religious decisionmaking. 
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Christian were recruited to participate.85 The interview data further 
assisted in the interpretation of several experimental results. 
This hybrid, multistage approach transmits the depth and validity of 
qualitative research into the breadth of quantitative studies, generating 
decisionmaking experiments from in-depth, contextual, and culturally 
sensitive qualitative data.86 The resulting experiments presented in Part 
II.E make innovative contributions to the literature. First, they expand 
current theories on the relative importance of outcomes and procedures 
to a context of compliance that had not been studied previously through 
these methods. Second, the results challenge the conventional wisdom of 
both the economic and procedural fairness of compliance. I begin by 
contextualizing these studies within the experiences of my interviewees 
with respect to how they view and act in conflicts between 
antidiscrimination law and their faith. 
B. What Makes a Conflict 
“[R]ules against birth control, rules against abortion, rules against gay 
and lesbian. Those all get to the sexual instincts . . . . Our sexual practices, 
our control of those sexual practices.” 
–Manager #2 
In the 1980s, some Christian groups believed that mothers of young 
children should not be allowed to work outside the home;87 others 
believed that God proscribed interracial relationships.88 These beliefs 
were institutionalized into employment and admission practices in 
schools and affiliated universities, which then dismissed employees who 
became pregnant, and conditioned, denied, and terminated the enrollment 
and employment of black people who did not comply with interracial 
dating bans. Today, few people of faith would disagree that these 
practices constitute discrimination and indeed, they are no longer in place.89 
But other moral controversies, old and new, are still burning, pervading 
workplaces and businesses: premarital sex and pregnancies; same-sex 
 
 85. Descriptive data on the sample is provided in Part II.E infra. To examine whether the 
dilemma presents a specific conflict to religious individuals rather than an instance of general bias 
which is not necessarily religious, Experiment Two recruited a sample of nonreligious individuals 
based on the same characteristics, in addition to the religious sample. 
 86. Though field experiments would be ideal were there not substantial ethical concerns, previous 
research demonstrated that real life materials significantly improve the external validity of 
decisionmaking experiments and achieve similar results to those reported in field studies. See Shelley 
J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 Am. J. Soc. 1297, 1327 (2007). 
 87. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 623 (1986). 
 88. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580–81 (1983). 
 89. Only in 2000 did Bob Jones University revoke its ban on interracial dating and cease 
conditioning admission of students of color upon committing to abstain from interracial relationships, 
following renewed public attention and criticism. See generally Minow, supra note 3. Dayton Christian 
Schools, like most other religious schools in the country, employ young mothers today.  
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marriage; abortion and contraceptives. As Manager #2 bluntly explained, 
most tensions evolve around sex and sexuality. 
While the controversies that feed the tension between religion and 
antidiscrimination law have changed over time, their general 
characteristics have remained similar. Though conflicts take place in a 
variety of legal contexts—dismissing pregnant or gay teachers, denying 
service to gay customers, or refusing health care coverage of 
contraceptives—many religious managers were likely to think about these 
conflicts as instances of the same problem. What, then, are the elements of 
the conflict? 
Firstly, each conflict presents a claim of autonomy, and specifically 
the right to administer one’s affairs—of whatever type and scale—
according to one’s beliefs, and to avoid “the federal government telling 
[one] what to do” (Manager #9). Traditionally, religious claims of 
autonomy have centered on schools and other institutions designed to 
carry out their religious mission.90 Yet, as recent cases demonstrate, other 
entities—including for-profit businesses—may develop ambitions to 
carry the mission and seek the autonomy to do so. Many managers 
viewed the educational and commercial claims as similarly justified: “I 
support what they’re [Hobby Lobby] trying to do, with the government 
telling them what they can—I mean, forcing them to do something 
against the beliefs of the owner” (Manager #7). The nomos (normative 
world) that religious managers discussed included canon law, but was not 
limited to it. Rather, it often comprised an intricate set of hard and soft 
commitments and convictions. This nomos, like any law (including civil 
law), was open to competing interpretations and was inherently 
indeterminate and case-specific—as Manager #2 noted: “decisions in 
these cases are very local . . . they can come down on any side.” 
The second cornerstone of the conflict is the relationship between 
the religious person and the morally disputed act, which is typically 
indirect: it is someone else who violates religious norms by engaging in 
premarital sex, wedding a same-sex partner, or using contraceptives. 
Nevertheless, most religious managers believed they have a duty to 
condemn these violations and not to abet them. They did not view their 
moral responsibility in these cases as remote or attenuated.91 Rather, they 
viewed requirements to provide services to moral offenders and/or 
 
 90. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 33 (1983); 
Walzer, supra note 14. 
 91. The “attenuation” argument was made by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent in Hobby Lobby. 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2799 (2014) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“I would 
conclude that the connection between the families’ religious objections and the contraceptive coverage 
requirement is too attenuated to rank as substantial.”). Similar points were made by the federal 
appeals courts that rejected recent challenges to the Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
contraceptives accommodation. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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prohibitions against removing them from employment as coercion into 
violating their own values and rules. 
The third element from which conflicts between faith and law 
evolve is related to the indirectness of the act: the regulation of other 
people—religious or nonreligious, employees, students, patients, or 
customers. The attempt to regulate others is clearly the core of the 
problem from a legal perspective.92 Yet from a religious perspective, this 
is the crux of the religious enterprise and the very justification for its 
existence. As Manager #7 explained, “[Jesus] didn’t say to his apostles, 
‘serve your own’, and not ‘only hire your own.’ He said, ‘Go out!’ Right? 
And baptize all people, and teach all people.” 
The detrimental impact that such regulation might have on its 
subjects occupies a more peripheral place in religious argumentation. 
Loss of employment or health insurance is rarely discussed, nor are the 
implications of being excluded, denied service or access. Instead, the 
perspective focuses on the offender’s moral responsibility for “breaking 
these values” (Experiment One, Participant #936) or “[going] against the 
standards,” and on the rights and freedoms of other religious 
stakeholders or the community as a whole (for example, “schools should 
protect students [from promiscuous teachers] at all costs” [Experiment I, 
Participant #936], or “parents are paying their money to send them to a 
school with certain views and morals” [Experiment One, Participant 
#864]). Penalty and exclusion seem like an inevitable consequence of 
violating religious norms (“she should have kept that in mind when she 
got pregnant” [Experiment One, Participant #673]). The enforcers of 
religious mores, in their view, are not harming innocent others. Rather, 
the people affected have sinned and should accept the consequences; 
they should certainly not expect religious people to “pay the price for 
their lack of moral fiber” as one participant put bluntly (Experiment 
One, Participant #814). These quotes best capture the normative 
divergence under which what seems like discrimination from one point of 
view is a justified (even necessary) exercise of religious authority from 
another. 
 
 92. For some of the main arguments in this spirit, see, for example: Caroline Mala Corbin, Above 
the Law?: The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 
Fordham L. Rev. 1965 (2007); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable 
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 555 (1997); Douglas NeJaime, 
Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 1169 (2012); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary 
Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 
Cornell L. Rev. 1049 (1996). See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790–91 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citing 
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento, 85 P.3d 67, 93 (Cal. 2004) (“We are 
unaware of any decision in which . . . [the U.S. Supreme Court] has exempted a religious objector from 
the operation of a neutral, generally applicable law despite the recognition that the requested 
exemption would detrimentally affect the rights of third parties.”).  
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The fourth and final element is the diverging legal and religious 
standards regarding sexuality.93 “[M]ost of these things have to do 
with . . . gay marriage, contraception, out-of-wedlock motherhood. Or it 
could be abortion issues, things of that sort,” said Manager #10, and 
similarly #17.94 The typical conflict involved teachers’ pregnancy out-of-
wedlock, or less often, teenage students, or pregnancy that resulted from 
IVF, which is forbidden for Catholics.95 Another frequently described 
dilemma involved a homosexual or lesbian teacher whose sexual identity 
became known, voluntarily or by anonymous informants, for instance, by 
“disgruntled” parents or concerned colleagues.96 The admission of 
students from gay families also raised some conflict (“when the pastor 
found this out, he withdrew the admission” [Manager #2]). Issues of 
contraceptives—birth control education or health insurance coverage—
also featured regularly. The interviews were conducted shortly before the 
Supreme Court decision in the Hobby Lobby case of which most 
educators were very cognizant, describing how the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) directly affected their institutions or dioceses.97 
These dilemmas were familiar to all principals, and those who did 
not encounter them personally had advised others on such matters, or 
simply followed the social trend with concern, noting that “Catholic 
schools are counter-culture” (Manager #5) and that “part of the cultural 
problem, issue, struggle, is that the Church has always lived in a 
pluralistic world” (Manager #14). The intensity of the conflict between 
society and the Church regarding sexuality was almost a source of anxiety. 
A president of a Catholic high school in the Midwest was particularly 
apprehensive of the day he would have to deal with a public coming-out 
of a gay teacher:  
 
 93. There are exceptions, however—sexuality was not an issue in the Hosanna-Tabour case, for 
example—at least not to the extent evident in the decision and in the memorials submitted to court on 
behalf of the parties. 
 94. Other tensions were sporadically mentioned—general tensions arising from hiring 
nonreligious individuals or catering to a religiously diverse student body (many Catholic schools today 
admit a significant number, in some schools even a majority, of non-Catholic students), strict 
vaccination policies that allow for no exemptions, and undocumented students and other immigration 
issues (primarily in the South).  
 95. Interview with Manager #1 (Feb. 2014); Interview with Manager #2 (Feb. 2014); Interview 
with Manager #4 (Mar. 2014); Interview with Manager #5 (Apr. 2014); Interview with Manager #8 
(May 2014); Interview with Manager #9 (May 2014). IVF was a “huge one,” according to Manager #9, 
as “the church rejects in-vitro surrogacy, all those kinds of methods. They only endorse natural 
conception and adoption. People who want to have babies using other methods, then, that can cause 
them to lose their job.” Id. 
 96. Interview with Manager #2, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #13 (June 2014). 
 97. Interview with Manager #1, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #5, supra note 95; 
Interview with Manager #7 (May 2014); Interview with Manager #13, supra note 96; Interview with 
Manager #14 (June 2014); Interview with Manager #16 (June 2014); Interview with Manager #17 (July 
2014). 
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There is going to be in [the area] a precedent-setting case, and I think 
every Catholic school, and this has come up through the Association of 
Catholic Schools Presidency in the area [refers to the local Catholic 
Education Association, N.B.C.] and in conversation, I think every 
school hopes that it’s not their school that is the first to see what that 
precedent will result in, but we all know that we’re facing this same 
dilemma.98 
C. How to Sustain Religious Order: A Firm Hand or a Kind Heart? 
In studying these conflicts, it became clear that there were two 
typical modes of response to them: a “firm hand” and a “kind heart.” 
“Firm hand” managers argued that removing the offense or offender is 
imperative, because the organization cannot succeed in instilling the 
Church’s teachings while having “in the building” an individual (for 
some, only employees; for others, also parents and students) who violates 
these teachings (“that would speak in direct conflict to what you’ve been 
teaching the students” [Manager #5]). From this perspective, dismissing 
the individual is not disparate treatment, but an appropriate reaction; the 
person is no longer able to perform her job because her ability to serve as 
a role model for students is substantially compromised by her behavior.99 
Managers’ use of language illuminated how they perceived their 
moral obligations in these cases: not dismissing was equal to “condoning” 
(Manager #2). Keeping the person was framed as an active choice to 
“enable” the individual “to continue to teach” (Manager #13), while 
dismissing her was a passive “letting go.” This framing changed the moral 
reference point, such that the salient consequences became those for the 
community (how school, students, and parents are affected) rather than 
those for the person losing their job (who was merely being “let go”). 
This logic was applied to all “employees in the building,” even cafeteria 
employees (Manager #9), and certainly was not limited to ministers. 
“Kind heart” managers framed the dilemma and the values and 
interests at stake very differently. For them, there were more religious 
values bearing on the decision than merely the one being violated 
including love, compassion, forgiveness, support, humility, and refraining 
from judgment. In addition, the consequences for the moral offender 
were salient to them. Manager #9, an administrator overseeing many 
school districts, said: “We have bishops that say, ‘No, we are going to 
forgive them. They can still teach. They have health insurance. They 
didn’t have an abortion. That’s a good thing. So we’re going to fully 
support them.’” Manager #2 also emphasized the complexity of the 
 
 98. Interview with Manager #13, supra note 96. 
 99. Interview with Manager #1, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #2, supra note 95; 
Interview with Manager #5, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #6 (May 2014); Interview with 
Manger #7, supra note 97; Interview with Manager #9, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #12 
(June 2014); Interview with Manager #13, supra note 96; Interview with Manager #14, supra note 97. 
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dilemma as various doctrines regarding premarital sex and abortion lead 
in different directions. Describing a change of heart in a diocese that 
dismissed unwed and pregnant teachers, leaving them empty-handed, but 
then offered them a full year’s pay and maintained their health 
insurance, she said: “I just feel as though, they felt like maybe we need to 
have a little more of the milk of human kindness in our legal decisions as 
well.” 
Manager #8 had a record of not expelling or dismissing individuals 
for pregnancy out of wedlock, abortion, or gay relationships. Her 
philosophy was that: “Although we cannot support the decision that you 
made, we can support you” and “[w]e believe that God may not love the 
sin, but he always loves the sinner. And, we can do no less.” Notably, 
managers taking the “kind heart” approach did not believe that sex out-
of-wedlock or gay marriage is religiously permissible, yet they prioritized 
the teachings emphasizing kindness, collegiality, and support. 
One factor that informs the divergence among religious managers in 
their use of a “firm hand” or a “kind heart”—and, ultimately, the 
likelihood of compliance with antidiscrimination law—is whether they 
perceived the conflict of norms as internal or external to their communities. 
Indeed, most managers viewed the trend toward sexual equality and 
antidiscrimination as emerging from the general nonreligious society, 
and therefore external in nature. Yet the ideas and values it brought 
forth were gradually penetrating religious boundaries, transforming the 
conflict from external to internal and the values at stake from secular 
values of equality and pluralism to religious values of compassion, 
forgiveness, inclusion, and humility—the very values that guide the “kind 
heart” approach. The parallel process by which (1) the arena of conflict 
relocates from the outside to the inside, and (2) antidiscrimination norms 
are appropriated and transformed into religious values appears to 
underlay the shift from “firm hand” to “kind heart” for many managers. 
The point along the spectrum from external to internal where the conflict 
was perceived to exist was closely tied to its mode of resolution: divorced 
from antidiscrimination law or aligned with it. Perhaps counterintuitively, 
the conflict needed to be perceived as internal to religion in order to 
ultimately yield adherence to antidiscrimination law. Absent an internal 
normative anchor, conflict with the law was much more likely. 
The first point on this spectrum is at the external and secular pole, 
where antidiscrimination norms are external to religion and the conflict 
takes place at the membrane separating the religious society from the 
outside world. Statements like “Catholic schools are counterculture” 
(Manager #5), “the struggle comes in between canon law and civil law” 
(Manager #13), or “[i]t’s not easy being a Christian or a Catholic in 
today’s world. Our faith asks us to do things that right now are not 
popular with society”—from a Montana superintendent’s press statement 
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regarding the dismissal of an unwed pregnant teacher100—reveal a view of 
the conflict as external and antithetical to religion. Under this view, 
antidiscrimination norms that are based on alternative sexual standards 
are religiously irrelevant. 
At some point, however, antidiscrimination norms might penetrate 
the religious membrane and begin resonating with members of religious 
communities. The conflict then relocates to inside the religious 
community, where it confronts the religious establishment, the inculcator 
and enforcer of religious norms. While the clergy and schools feel 
committed to sustaining the traditional normative order, their faith 
community no longer necessarily shares this commitment. These internal 
discrepancies can be extremely stressful (a “nightmare,” in the words of 
Managers #5 and #13) for managers who adopt a “firm hand” approach 
and make decisions that, though traditionally religious, are nevertheless 
perceived as discriminatory in their communities. These managers may 
suffer disapproval and critique for what they often feel is a religious 
necessity. Manager #10 described an episode in Seattle where a gay 
teacher married his partner and was dismissed. This decision “created a 
firestorm for [the principal] and the school community because all of the 
pushback they got from the stakeholders, you know, the parents, the 
kids, and so on.” The pushback from the community was so intense that 
the principal who dismissed the gay teacher eventually resigned.101 
The third level of internalization occurs when antidiscrimination 
norms penetrate to the core of the religious establishment itself, and 
conflict is characterized by divergent positions of administrators and 
clergy members, or by a struggle that takes place within the individual. 
Manager #12 described the dilemma of expelling a pregnant teen as one 
where “your faith kind of gets in the way of what the handbook, per se, 
states.” At this point of internalization of the conflict, antidiscrimination 
norms—or, more accurately, the values they protect—seemingly 
transform. It is hard to separate cause from effect, but managers who 
described conflicts over unwed pregnancies and same-sex couples as 
internal (in the sense described here) also perceived them as conflicts 
between competing religious norms, instructive and calling for opposite 
decisions. Under this narrative, equality, pluralism, liberalism, and 
 
 100. Kelley Christensen, Diocese Stands by Firing Decision; Teacher’s Lawyer Won Similar Case, 
Mont. Standard (Feb. 6, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://mtstandard.com/news/local/diocese-stands-by-firing- 
decision-teacher-s-lawyer-won-similar/article_c12a5e44-8dc7-11e3-808b-001a4bcf887a.html. 
 101. Referring to Zmuda v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, which received 
considerable coverage in the media. No. 14-2-07007-1, 2014 WL 1377720 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 
2014). See Mike Baker, Mark Zmuda, Gay Catholic Vice Principal, Says Gay Marriage Prompted 
Firing, Huffington Post (Jan. 6, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/06/mark-zmuda- 
gay-marriage-_n_4550217.html. Manager #2 described a similar episode where the exclusionary 
decision was eventually overturned and the bishop who rendered it resigned. Interview with Manager 
#2, supra note 95. 
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antidiscrimination were not primary motivations. Rather, antidiscrimination 
was reasoned in terms of forgiveness for sin (Manager #9), humility (“we 
are all sinners” [Manager #2]), evangelism (requiring inclusion [Managers 
#2, #9, and #11]), compassion (Manager #5), kindness (Manager #2), and 
love (Manager #15). 
While the two spectra I described—conflict internalization and 
normative transformation—are tied to one another, individuals were not 
necessarily tied to a single point along these spectra. Indeed, individuals 
often manifested multiple levels of conflict internalization as they shifted 
between narratives reflecting different times, communities, or teachings. 
Yet where the managers narrated a certain conflict as an internal 
religious debate, they were more likely to describe it in terms of competing 
religious values, to adopt a “kind heart” approach, and to resolve it in a 
way that aligned with antidiscrimination norms. In these instances, 
religious and civic norms converged and their conflict was largely mitigated. 
At a more general level, the multiple ways in which the conflict is 
perceived, processed, and eventually determined reveal two crucial facts. 
Firstly, religious decisionmaking is dynamic and responsive to external 
trends and forces that push for change. Secondly, this dynamic takes the 
specific form of competition between religious values. In this competition, 
traditional norms regarding sexuality are balanced against more general 
and widely applicable principles that are used to interpret and justify a 
nonmoralizing and nondiscriminatory approach. In the debate between a 
firm hand and a kind heart, one approach tends toward condemning 
religious violations and excluding religious offenders, whereas the second 
is inclusive and rehabilitative. These insights become particularly 
informative when considering the experimental results. 
D. Money Can Buy Me Freedom 
“My first instinct would be to offer to buy out the contract.” 
–Manager #8102 
In the aftermath of the competition between rival religious approaches, 
a decision is made. Deciding to dismiss employees for violating religious 
doctrine or withdrawing enrollment of students from gay families can 
have legal ramifications. Yet these ramifications were not a salient factor 
for the managers, perhaps because the course of events rarely led to the 
courtroom (even in cases of employee dismissals). And for some, they 
were not even a concern. One conservative manager noted incidentally 
that “it’s an issue when you have people who are taking advantage of 
civil rights, but it is not a right that extends to the Church.” (Manager 
#9). Even liberal managers mentioned civil rights among their lowest 
 
 102. In response to a question about what she would do if a court ordered her to reinstate a 
teacher fired for pregnancy out of wedlock.  
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concerns (if at all), after “PR nightmare,” “protesters and picketers and 
students who walk out,” school reputation and enrollment, “people 
[leaving] the Church,” the extinction of the Church if “the next 
generation doesn’t buy into the teachings of the Church,” and then 
finally, “it also gets into civil rights. It’s also a violation of civil rights” 
(Manager #13). Many educators, regardless of their basic approach—
“firm” or “kind”—were confident that should such cases ever reach the 
courts, the Church would win—if not due to religious freedom, then due 
to contract law: “in most of the instances, at least in Catholic schools, 
when word ever came to my attention, the court has found in favor of the 
school because the school had not been disingenuous. You know, it was 
spelled out in a contract” (Manager #8).103 
When a court rules in your favor, there is no further dilemma to 
consider. But what would religious decisionmakers do should the court 
rule against them? “I would fight till the end a decision to reinstate [the 
person], which I would see as an interference in our ability to run our 
schools freely,” said a prominent New England bishop. While other 
interviewees did not repeat this stance as strongly as Interviewee #1, 
reinstatement—as well as other impositions of performance duties—was 
perceived as unrealistic. Yet the managers frequently referred to 
damages as an acceptable resolution to the conflict (the New England 
bishop included),104 and even described instances in which they proactively 
sought financial settlement, often despite being certain of the morality of 
their stance. 
Manager #8, a former president of several Catholic schools who 
currently holds a senior administrative position, said: “if the school was 
ruled against, they would create a financial settlement, in order for the 
teacher not to return to the classroom.” Referring to the dismissal of a 
gay teacher, another senior superintendent noted that though the teacher 
was asked to resign: “it was a very fair letting go . . . you know, with 
compensation” (Manager #5). Educators also noted that the Church is 
usually willing to reach financial settlement in these cases, effectively 
avoiding a lawsuit: “[T]hese teachers were going to sue. But in the end, 
the Church gave them everything they would have been entitled to, 
 
 103. Interview with Manager #2, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #4, supra note 95; 
Interview with Manager #5, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #6, supra note 99; Interview with 
Manager #8, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #14, supra note 97.  
[I]t doesn’t happen real often, but if we’re taken to court we’ve always been able to say, 
‘Your Honor, here is what we’re trying to do, and here’s the reason for that rule. And here’s 
how we follow through on it.’ So we have a contract in the very broad sense of the term. 
The contract we made with our parents, with our faculty, and with our publics.  
Id. 
 104. Interview with Manager #1, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #2, supra note 95; 
Interview with Manager #5, supra note 95; Interview with Manager #8, supra note 95; Interview with 
Manager #9, supra note 95. 
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which was a full year’s pay and benefits; so there was no case” (Manager 
#20). In the concise words of Manager #6: “Sometimes the Church I 
guess is sued. And then you have to pay the damages.” 
Rejecting performance as interference with autonomy and liberty is 
expected.105 The consent to payment, however, is surprising given the 
confidence that managers had in the morality and legality of their 
decisions. Nevertheless, the mentality that damages are simply a price 
one pays for religious autonomy, and a natural consequence resulting 
from certain decisions, was in fact very common. If so, damages might 
offer a way to settle the conflict through compensation and acceptance of 
responsibility (on the part of religion), alongside preservation and 
acceptance of autonomy (on the part of law)—compatible with conventional 
economic wisdom. 
But if damages are perceived as merely a price that religious 
institutions pay to act according to their values, damages might also be 
interpreted as a legal permit to discriminate, increasing tendencies to 
deviate from antidiscrimination law in the long run. This effect has been 
previously documented in several more mundane and lower stakes 
contexts,106 but never in the context of conflicts between law and religion. 
If damages exacerbate the conflict it clearly escapes the notice of the 
courts that award them while condemning religious discrimination. I 
therefore examine the impact of monetary sanctions on religious 
adherence to antidiscrimination law. I conducted two experiments to study 
the complex interaction between outcome and norms and to examine 
potential procedural fairness influences. 
E. The Impact of Damages, Reinstatement, and Process: Two 
Experiments 
1. Design and Research Questions 
How do individuals resolve dilemmas that juxtapose religious 
teachings and civil rights law, and what impact, if any, do legal outcomes 
and procedural fairness have on their decisions? Following the 
interviews, two experiments were designed to examine these questions. 
The purpose was to examine, firstly, what decisions a broad pool of 
religious people actually makes when facing such dilemmas, and how 
those decisions are influenced by their religiosity and general demographic 
characteristics. To what extent are religious individuals inclined to defy 
antidiscrimination law that conflicts with traditional religious norms? 
 
 105. See supra notes 24–27 and the accompanying text. 
 106. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 51 (explaining that in a field experiment, imposing fines 
on late daycare pickups increased the number of parents arriving late, supporting the hypothesis that 
parents interpreted the fine as a price they were willing to pay); see also supra notes 52–54 and the 
accompanying text. 
Barak_Corren_21 (Hamilton).doc (Do Not Delete) 5/10/2016 4:15 PM 
May 2016]        BEHAVIOR, RELIGION, AND DISCRIMINATION 989 
Secondly, the experiments examine whether particularly fair courts can 
secure greater obedience to their decisions,107 and whether people are 
more likely to obey a monetary award than a reinstatement order. 
Thirdly and crucially, the experiments examine the question drawn from 
the interviews regarding the projected impact of process and outcome—
namely, how does a mild or strict sanction today influence adherence to 
the law in future conflicts between church and state?108 
Following the methodology described in Part II.A, a questionnaire 
was designed to elicit and test participants’ intentions to adhere to the 
law. The questionnaire centered on a vignette describing an out-of-
wedlock pregnancy dilemma, chosen for its salience in the case law and 
in the accounts of religious managers.109 The vignette was written based 
on the experiences of the managers to create a dilemma that would be 
relevant and credible from a religious standpoint. Specific Catholic 
nuances were omitted to fit a broader Christian sample.110 Several 
religious individuals reviewed the entire study prior to launch, to ensure 
that the language and measures were appropriate and adequate given the 
purposes of the research.111 The experiment went beyond the managerial 
population to examine a diverse sample of 1303 Christian individuals.112 
 
 107. Notably, procedural concerns were not salient in the interviews, as most conflicts discussed by 
managers were never litigated. Yet in light of the extensive documentation of procedural fairness 
effects in other contexts, it was important to examine whether they may affect religious decisions in a 
more controlled setting. 
 108. See supra Part II.D, and in particular the last two paragraphs of that Part, for further 
discussion of the role of sanctions in conflicts between the church and state. 
 109. Focusing on one scenario was necessary to effectively test the research hypotheses, as 
additional scenarios would have limited the number of questions asked with respect to each scenario 
and would have resulted in a rather superficial understanding of the motivations involved. Creating 
more condition groups for additional scenarios would have required doubling the size of the sample 
for each scenario added. As statistical power calculations already required large samples—1300 
participants in Experiment One and 2200 participants in Experiment Two—testing additional 
scenarios is left to further research. Importantly, though decisions are expected to vary based on the 
characteristics of the conflict between antidiscrimination law and religious doctrine, the qualitative 
analysis and evidence suggest that the various conflicts share much in common. For example referring 
to pregnancy out of wedlock and same-sex marriage, Manager #10 noted that “in both cases you have 
sexual activity outside the sacrament of marriage. So, I think the bishops would view it as sort of, the 
same sort of matter.” These perceived similarities facilitated inferences from one case to the other. 
 110. Notably, the unwed pregnancy dilemma, as well as gay marriage and most other dilemmas 
discussed so far, are not unique to Catholic institutions. 
 111. In addition, a pilot (N = 80) including religious and nonreligious individuals was conducted on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk’s labor market to ensure clarity and comprehensibility.  
 112. The experiments were administered online by Survey Sampling International, Inc. (“SSI”), a 
professional survey company founded in 1977 and offering online samples for fifteen years. 
Participants were drawn from SSI’s panels and various online communities, social networks and 
websites of all types in the United States. Sample size was determined to be 1300 based on power 
calculations (80% power, effect size of d = 1). To minimize the impact of partisan bias, recruitment 
was stratified such that half of the participants were Democrats and half Republicans. A simple free 
text check ensured that participants read the survey, screening ninety-one participants (6.5% of the 
original sample). Screening was performed prior to data analysis and data collection continued until 
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Broadening the study beyond the interview population added 
validity to the results and made them more generalizable. It also imposed 
inevitable limitations, however, as nonmanagers are less likely to be 
involved in handling the relevant conflicts. This concern is mitigated, 
however, in light of the managers’ accounts that repeatedly emphasized 
the impact of their communities, including parents and students, on the 
decisions made in the various conflicts. If religious managers are 
attentive to their communities, and community members indeed 
influence the way conflicts evolve, as demonstrated in Part II.C, we may 
carefully proceed to survey members of these communities under the 
assumption that their responses reveal valuable information on the 
actual dynamics of the conflict. 
In order to further enhance the external validity of the study—
namely the extent to which it approximates and is compatible with real 
life settings—the dilemma was written and formatted as a news story 
(Figure 1 below), based on Christian media observations and the 
interviews. As such, the dilemma was presented in a way that closely 
tracked how people actually consume information and form judgments 
on social and legal issues.113 Participants were informed that the dilemma 
was written for the purposes of the study, based on a true story. The text 
of the dilemma noted both religious values and antidiscrimination law, 
avoiding technical and formal legalistic terms. The dilemma read as 
follows: 
 
1300 valid responses were collected. The sample was 54% women and 36% Catholic, and the average 
age was 48.6 years (SD = 16.6 years). 
 113. These multiple improvements on the conventional vignette method mitigate many of the 
criticisms addressed toward vignette studies. The current experiment springs from actual experiences 
of the relevant population and is sensitive to the language that pertinent individuals use to share their 
stories, and it situates its vignette in a context and format commonly used for reading and forming 
judgment.  
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Figure 1: The Principal’s Dilemma114 
 
 
Following the story, participants were asked what they would do if 
they were the principal of the school. They answered using a scale 
ranging from -5 (definitely dismiss the teacher) to 5 (definitely not dismiss 
the teacher) with 0 as scale midpoint. In this Article’s terminology, this 
decision reflected participants’ intended adherence to the law. 
Participants proceeded to read the dilemma’s sequel: the principal 
decided to dismiss the teacher, and the teacher filed suit. At this point, 
participants were randomized to read one of four descriptions of the 
legal proceedings:  
(1) The court deployed standard procedures and ultimately 
decided to reinstate the teacher;  
(2) The court deployed particularly fair, neutral, and respectful 
procedures, and ultimately decided to reinstate the teacher;  
(3) The court deployed standard procedures and ultimately 
decided to order the school to pay compensations for lost pay and 
benefits but did not reinstate the teacher;  
(4) Likewise, only that the court deployed particularly fair 
procedures.115  
 
 114. The dilemma presented to participants, with the question: if you were the principal, what 
would you do? Notably, cases of teacher dismissal due to pregnancy out of wedlock span a variety of 
roles, positions, affiliations, and personal circumstances. To keep the dilemma general, I avoided 
further teacher specifications. 
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In all condition groups participants read that the court decided that 
“it was unlawful to dismiss the teacher” and the only difference with 
respect to the outcome was in the nature of the order: whether the school 
was ordered to compensate the teacher for lost pay and benefits or 
whether it was ordered to reinstate her. Participants were then asked 
what they would do now (still as the principal), providing their responses 
on a scale ranging from -5 (definitely not comply with the decision) to 5 
(definitely comply with the decision) with 0 as the scale midpoint. They 
were also given the option to provide additional comments. In this 
Article’s terminology, this decision reflected participants’ intended 
obedience to the court. 
Finally, the projected effects of the nature of the court decision were 
tested, as participants were asked to respond to the following situation: 
“A year after the court’s decision a virtually identical case happens again, 
this time with another teacher in your school. What would you do now?” 
Participants again provided response on a -5 to 5 scale. In this 
Article’s terminology, this question examined informed adherence to the 
law, meaning the decision participants intend to make in the aftermath of 
a judicial decision and in the face of a new dilemma, with all of the 
information they now possess on the state of the law and the 
consequences of dismissal.116 
The four experimental conditions created a two-by-two matrix 
where each participant was randomized to see only one combination of 
outcome and process. As participants were randomly assigned into different 
groups, identical in all respects except for the experimental “treatment,” 
any difference in their responses can be attributed directly to that 
treatment—the different information on process and outcome. This design 
allowed for a controlled test of four key questions, beyond naïve adherence 
to the law:  
(1) Do varying degrees of procedural fairness result in different 
intentions to obey an unfavorable court order?  
(2) Do different legal outcomes—reinstatement and damages—
result in different intentions to obey the court?  
 
 115. The description of the procedures and outcomes followed the same methodology used to 
create the basic scenario. The procedural fairness manipulation was chosen following a pilot that 
compared several different options of varying court fairness. The chosen description featured all four 
widely accepted dimensions of procedural fairness discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Tyler & Huo, 
supra note 65; Tyler, Why People Obey, supra note 33; Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 71; Tyler, supra 
note 58. I am grateful to Tom Tyler for invaluable advice regarding the design of this study. For the 
full text of the four descriptions, see infra Appendix A.  
 116. In the last section of the study, participants were asked about their general attitude toward 
the courts and were asked to rate various factors which contributed to their decisionmaking. 
Demographic information pertaining to religious affiliation, belief, service attendance, worldview, 
legal training, involvement in lawsuit, and previous experience as a schoolteacher was collected on the 
last screen. 
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(3) Do fairness and outcome interact such that people are most 
likely to obey the decision when the court is both particularly fair and 
the judgment is relatively mild, and contrariwise in inverse 
circumstances?  
(4) Crucially, do different legal outcomes and/or varying degrees 
of fairness project an impact on future adherence in conflicts between 
faith and law? 
2. Experiment One: Results 
How did religious individuals resolve a dilemma between religious 
teachings and antidiscrimination law? Notably, most individuals were 
inclined to adhere to the law, whereas one in four participants (circa 
23%) was inclined to dismiss the pregnant out-of-wedlock teacher.117 
Participants’ frequency of church attendance was the measure with 
the highest impact on adherence to the law. Participants who frequently 
attended services were more inclined to dismiss the teacher, but even 
daily attendees were slightly more inclined to keep the teacher than to 
dismiss her (Figure 2).118 Men (26.3%), Republicans (27.6%), and 
Evangelicals (33%) were more inclined to dismiss the teacher (versus 
20.3% of women, 18.3% of Democrats, and 20% to 26% of Catholics and 
other Christians), yet these effects were simply additives to the robust 
effect of religiosity on decisionmaking.119 
 
 117. Most of the analyses below are based on the raw scale responses (ranging from -5 to 5). In 
some instances such as here, a dichotomous measure is used for simplification (this did not affect the 
significance of the results). Scale responses were dichotomized based on the scale midpoint (0) for the 
three decisions of interest: naïve adherence to the law and informed adherence to the law were 
dichotomized into dismissed or not, and compliance with the court was dichotomized into complied or 
not. 
 118. The Pearson Chi Square statistic was 65.529 with six degrees of freedom, p < .001. Also 
significant were religious identity, a measure adapted from the classic work of Fred Mael & Blake E. 
Ashforth, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, in 14.1 Academy of Management Review 20 
(1989), and identity fusion, adapted from William B. Swann Jr. et al., When Group Membership Gets 
Personal: A Theory of Identity Fusion, in 119.3 Psychological Review 441 (2012). A regression 
predicting dismissal intentions from church attendance (Beta = .42, p < .001) and integrated religious 
identity (Beta = .27, p = .02) was highly significant. 
 119. Adherence to the law was regressed on religious participation, religious affiliation, religious 
identity and belonging, conservatism, political affiliation, gender, age, income, education, and race 
(the order reflects relevance to the research questions; for example, political affiliation and gender 
were expected to be highly relevant to decisionmaking, race much less so). In the final iteration of the 
regression, the beta coefficient of church attendance was .362, the t-statistic was 6.1, p < .001 and the 
beta coefficient of religious identity was .22, the t-statistic was 1.95, p = .052. Evangelism (the t-statistic 
was 2.8, p=.005) and gender (the t-statistic was 3.38, p = .001) were both highly significant. Republican 
affiliation, though significant in a separate t-test analysis, was no longer significant once included in a 
model with all other variables (p=.762). Income, education, and race had no significant impact. 
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Figure 2: Teacher Dismissal and Church Attendance in 
Experiment One 
As described above, after making the first adherence decision 
participants were randomized into one of two-by-two follow-up 
scenarios: they either read that the court awarded damages or that the 
court reinstated the teacher (money versus performance). And in each 
case, the judicial process was either standard or particularly fair. The 
interesting question became: what would people who chose to deviate 
from the law do in the face of a court that declared the decision illegal? 
To answer this question, the analysis focused on the 300 participants 
who chose to dismiss the teacher. Notably, their intentions to comply 
with the court decision were high in all four conditions, despite 
participants’ initial defiant intentions. The high level of compliance was 
relatively insensitive to the procedural fairness exhibited by the court 
and the type of outcome—reinstatement or damages. Participants did not 
appear to find reinstatement less acceptable than damages and were not 
influenced by the information regarding the court’s procedural fairness. 
The immediate impact of both outcome and process was small and 
insignificant; any preference for or aversion to a particular outcome was 
not reflected in participants’ decisions at this stage. 
A different picture emerged with respect to participants’ informed 
adherence, namely their decision in the subsequent dilemma regarding 
the potential dismissal of the second unmarried pregnant teacher. 
Focusing again on the 300 participants who dismissed the first teacher, an 
analysis of variance (“ANOVA”) revealed that intentions to adhere to 
the law were higher overall in the second dilemma. Hence the negative 
court judgment had a general effect of raising adherence intentions. The 
key finding, however, was that the type of outcome had a significant 
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effect that nuanced the general increase in adherence (Figure 3). 
Specifically, participants in the damages treatment (who read that the court 
ordered the school to pay the monetary equivalent of the employment 
contract) were more likely to dismiss the second teacher than participants 
in the reinstatement condition (who read that the court ordered the school 
to reinstate the teacher), although both groups read that the dismissal was 
illegal.120 
 
Figure 3: Projected Effect of Legal Outcome on Adherence to 
Antidiscrimination Law in Experiment One 
 
Figure 3: Prior to reading the court decision, participants in the 
damages and reinstatement conditions did not differ in their intentions 
to dismiss the teacher (“original decision”). After the “treatment” a 
significant difference emerged: deviant participants who read that the 
court reinstated the teacher were on average more likely to keep the 
second teacher than deviant participants who read that the court 
ordered damages rather than reinstatement (note that the average of 
the damages group is higher in the subsequent decision than in the 
original decision, yet still negative). The difference between the two 
groups was statistically significant. F=5.414, p = .021, N = 300. 
 
 120. In the reinstatement group, average adherence to the law (informed) was +1, well into the 
adherence zone, versus -0.5 in the damages group (standard deviations were 3.2 in both groups). The 
analysis was robust and in fact became more significant including the effect of prior decisions—
original adherence and compliance with the court—on the informed adherence decision. The F 
statistic of outcome was 5.414 with 1 and 296 degrees of freedom, p = .021. Notably, the average 
adherence in the original decision did not differ between the two groups (-2 in reinstatement, -1.9 in 
damages). A within-subject repeated-measures analysis on first and second dismissal choices while 
controlling for level of compliance with the court yielded virtually identical results (the F statistic for 
outcome was 5.638 with 1 and 295 degrees of freedom, p = .018). 
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This effect was substantial in actual number terms: a small majority 
(51%) of participants in the reinstatement condition—regardless of 
fairness—went on to keep the teacher in the second dilemma, whereas 
only a minority of participants in the damages condition (36%) decided 
to keep her. The rest (64%) went on to dismiss her. 
Procedural fairness did not emerge as a significant factor influencing 
informed (or subsequent) adherence, although participants in the fair 
condition were slightly more inclined to adhere to the law than those in 
the standard process condition.121 Participants who did not originally elect 
to dismiss the teacher (the adherent cohort) were not influenced by 
outcome or procedural fairness and maintained high adherence intentions. 
3. What Does Experiment One Teach Us About Normative Conflict 
and Adherence to the Law? 
Experiment One has several significant findings. First, religious 
individuals are not unanimous with respect to conflict between 
antidiscrimination law and traditional religious values. While a 
substantial group was inclined to defy the law, the majority of religious 
participants across all denominations and levels of practice (including 
daily attendees and Evangelicals and Catholics) were inclined to act in 
keeping with antidiscrimination law. This remarkable finding justifies 
further investigation as to the specific nature of participants’ beliefs 
(hereinafter in Experiment Two). 
Second, turning the focus to religious objectors revealed that they 
were nevertheless likely to obey a court judgment that declared their 
original decision unlawful and ordered measures to reverse it. Contrary 
to conventional judicial wisdom and the managerial insight, they also did 
not find reinstatement less acceptable than damages. Learning that 
people intend to obey the court despite their original decisions and 
without revealing significant sensitivity to the type of legal outcome is 
both surprising and reassuring. 
Third, contrary to predictions, procedural fairness information had 
no impact on obedience or adherence in a subsequent dilemma. Perhaps 
people need to see fairness rather than read about it. But it also raises 
the possibility that in a charged conflict, it is not enough for legal 
authorities to be particularly fair—attentive, neutral, respectful, and 
benevolent—to encourage adherence to the law. At the very least, 
people appear less sensitive to cues regarding procedural fairness, even 
when they are highly salient in an experimental setting.122 Procedural 
 
 121. The F statistic was 2.811 with 1 and 296 degrees of freedom and p = .095. Controlling for court 
compliance rendered procedural fairness less significant (p = .19). There was no interaction effect 
between outcome and fairness. 
 122. See infra Appendix A. 
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fairness might have hit its ceiling. Importantly, however, the experiment 
reveals nothing about the floor that adherence may drop to if the court is 
unfair.123 
Finally, the nuanced hypothesis that the outcome rendered by the 
court would affect decisionmaking in subsequent dilemmas was borne 
out by the data. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of a judicial 
decision, people seemed to obey the court regardless of the outcome. In 
the longer term, however, declaring the action illegal was insufficient to 
prevent it from reoccurring. While court intervention did substantially 
reduce future dismissals across outcomes, reversing the deed and 
reinstating the teacher yielded significantly more adherence to the law in 
a subsequent dilemma than awarding damages. This effect is particularly 
important given that it predominantly impacted the population that was 
most inclined to dismiss the pregnant out-of-wedlock teacher—the most 
pertinent decisionmakers. 
These results shed light on the “reinstatement aversion” and 
“damages-seeking” preferences expressed by religious school managers.124 
Financial awards and settlements might buy religious organizations 
autonomy and freedom to make decisions that comport with their values, 
among the options available to them under the law. Yet this freedom 
comes with adverse effects for individuals protected by 
antidiscrimination law and compromises antidiscrimination long-term 
goals. Scholars have written on the undercompensatory nature of monetary 
damages, and argued that money fails to repair the sense of hurt and 
injustice.125 But beyond local, distributive justice concerns, the results 
here suggest a more general drawback of monetary damages, a negative 
projected impact on subsequent adherence to the law. Following the 
outcome preferences of religious managers by allowing the buyout of 
legal obligations rather than compliance with the law is likely to result in 
more individuals being dismissed. This projected impact should not be 
regarded lightly given that religious tensions (particularly around 
antidiscrimination issues) are rarely one-time events. 
Why does reinstatement yield greater adherence to 
antidiscrimination law than monetary damages? Two possible explanations 
should be considered. First, sanctions operate as prices. If the price of 
deviating from the law does not exceed the foreseen benefit of standing 
firmly by religious values, people will continue deviating. Reinstating the 
teacher, under this explanation, has a better chance of discouraging 
 
 123. Describing the court as unfair was of little theoretical and practical interest for the present 
endeavor, in which the research question was whether courts can encourage, rather than discourage, 
adherence to the law beyond some standard baseline. 
 124. See supra Part II.C. 
 125. See supra notes 25–27 and the accompanying text. 
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future dismissals because it nullifies the incremental benefit of dismissal 
(over the costs of damages). 
Along similar lines, the higher adherence generally found in the 
second dismissal dilemma can be attributed, from an economic 
perspective, to participants’ adjusted understanding that their decision 
would likely be subject to legal scrutiny and sanctions. In other words, 
the unfavorable court decision made the probability of (any) sanction 
appear higher, encouraging adherence to the law across outcomes, while 
the variance in magnitude between outcomes drove the specific 
differences between reinstatement and damages. 
An alternative explanation is that monetary awards yield more 
dismissals because they signal to religious individuals that the values 
underlying the law are “for sale” and therefore of lower normative status 
than the competing religious values. The research on sacred values shows 
that people are not willing to trade values they hold sacred for other 
values.126 A natural inference is that if another person is willing to trade 
her norm for money, then this norm is apparently less important.127 
Furthermore, multiple studies show that fines may encourage a 
proscribed behavior rather than reduce it, apparently eroding the 
intrinsic motivation to follow social norms by reframing the situation as a 
standard transaction in which one buys a permit to deviate. Both 
perspectives on the relationship between money and norms suggest that 
should the court—the very entity entrusted with applying and enforcing 
the law—be willing to trade the prohibition on discrimination for a 
monetary award, then apparently breaking the prohibition was a valid 
option to begin with, and perhaps even within that afforded by the law. 
According to this view, reinstatement encourages adherence precisely 
because it resists translation into costs and benefits, signaling that the 
court stands firmly by the law, and that antidiscrimination law is not up 
for negotiation or trade. 
A potential mechanism by which such normative processes gain 
traction can be seen in the differences between how participants in the 
damages versus reinstatement conditions reasoned their choices to 
comply with the court. Participant #787 was randomly assigned to the 
damages condition. After reading the court judgment (with which she 
decided to comply), she stated: “This is a good solution. The school did 
not have to hire her back or compromise their standards.” 
Unsurprisingly, this participant went on to dismiss the second teacher in 
the subsequent dilemma, providing an even lower scale response than 
her original decision. 
 
 126. Baron & Spranca, supra note 47; Tetlock, supra note 47. 
 127. Note that religious decisionmakers cooperating with monetary awards do not engage in 
sacred trade-offs as the value being traded is not a religious value. Indeed, the payment safeguards 
religious values. 
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Now consider the response of Participant #879, a participant 
randomized to the reinstatement condition. She also decided to comply 
with the court and said: “ultimately however, the pregnant woman is the 
one who has to live with the consequences from the choice she made to 
conceive outside of wedlock.” Recall that refraining from judgment was 
one of the features of the “kind heart” approach, noted in Part II.C, as a 
managerial approach that yielded higher adherence to antidiscrimination 
law. Similarly, Participant #1096 suggested that “helping the individual 
come to terms with a moral mistake through forgiveness and acceptance 
is the goal, after she is reinstated into her position again.” Though both 
these participants decided to dismiss the first teacher, upon reading that 
the court reinstated her they came to consider other teachings—
responsibility, forgiveness, and compassion. They reframed the situation 
around different religious values, and although this reframing made no 
reference to equality, it subsequently led to alignment with the law. 
This kind of reasoning was fairly common in the reinstatement 
group,128 yet absent from the comments of damages participants. The turn 
to compassion and forgiveness as causes for action can be understood as 
an emergence of the “kind heart” approach that was first identified in the 
narratives of religious managers, an alternative to a “firm hand” in 
applying religious doctrine.129 Indeed, the approaches taken by managers 
and participants seem to converge at this point, as both populations use 
the same values to reach the same inclusive conclusion. Strikingly, 
Experiment One suggests that externally imposed legal outcomes might 
influence the religious lens through which people observe the dilemma 
(“firm hand” or “kind heart”), and might even alter the tendency to 
decide the dilemma one way or the other. Perhaps, then, the mechanism 
distinguishing reinstatement from damages is that the two outcomes 
 
 128. Another trend found in the explanations of participants in the reinstatement condition was a 
note of the rule of law as a reason for compliance (for example, “the law is the law” [Participant #407]; 
“after expressing disagreement with the law it should be followed until or if changed” [Participant 
#1022]). This is another indication of internalization of the normative message conveyed in a 
reinstatement decision, albeit less surprising. Notably, some participants in the reinstatement 
condition also mentioned the law’s coerciveness as a reason to comply with the court decision (for 
example, “the school . . . had no choice after the court ordered them to” [Participant #371]; “you have 
to hire her if it is against the law” [Participant #1097]). Yet unlike “kind heart” or “rule of law” 
explanations which uniquely characterized participants who chose to keep the second teacher, 
coerciveness was noted by second time deviants as well as adherers (for example, “he doesn’t seem to 
have an option to comply or not,” said Participant #936 who went on to fire the second teacher; “he 
has no choice but I side with him on the matter” [Participant #1412]). It therefore seems a less likely 
explanation for the increase in subsequent adherence in the reinstatement condition. In particular, the 
frequent note of the court’s coerciveness by people who chose to dismiss the second teacher indicates 
that although they viewed the law as coercive, they still felt potent to act against it. 
 129. See supra Part II.C. 
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provide participants with different takeaway messages; these messages 
then influence participants when making subsequent adherence decisions.130 
4. Experiment Two 
Experiment One left open two possible interpretations. If 
subsequent adherence is merely a matter of price, we would expect that 
raising the price considerably by imposing supercompensatory damages 
that go well beyond lost pay and benefits would discourage nonadherence 
more than regular monetary awards, possibly even exceeding the effect of 
reinstatement if the costs are sufficiently high. 
The alternative interpretation of Experiment One is that monetary 
awards encourage less adherence to the law because they signal to 
religious individuals that antidiscrimination values are for sale and 
therefore of lower normative status than the competing religious values. 
If subsequent adherence is a function of the normative message 
embedded in the sanction, rather than its magnitude, we would expect that 
damages, even of a high sum, would still fare worse than reinstatement in 
encouraging adherence to the law. If people largely view the situation as 
a conflict between competing values rather than as a balance of costs and 
benefits, they would be more sensitive to this type of normative message 
than to the magnitude of the sanction. While punitive damages clearly 
send a normative message—a message of sanction and punishment—they 
still signal that buying out of antidiscrimination values is possible. 
Therefore, under the normative message hypothesis, reinstatement should 
retain its impact as the better motivator for subsequent adherence, yet we 
would also expect punitive damages to motivate adherence to the law 
more than compensatory damages due to the normative condemnation 
attached to the award.131 
In order to tease apart these two competing explanations, 
Experiment Two introduced a third “treatment”: supercompensatory 
 
 130. Future research can consider additional explanations. For example, Asli Bali and David 
Enoch suggested to me that defying the law might be primarily driven from a need to signal religious 
loyalty. In that case, once objectors clarified their loyalties, they might prefer a course of action that 
avoids clashes with the law to a course of conflict. This insight can account for objectors’ general 
willingness to obey the court and the general rise in adherence under both outcomes, but it does not 
explain the differences between reinstatement and damages. Somewhat similarly, Ruth Halperin-
Kaddari suggested that religious objectors might actually prefer reinstatement to damages if their 
commitment to the religious norm is not strong and their actual preference is conflict avoidance. 
Another interesting possibility, suggested by Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, is that adherence to the law 
might be tied to objectors’ perceptions of personal choice. These are all thought-provoking suggestions 
for future studies. 
 131. “Compensatory” is used here in contrast to “punitive” and not necessarily according to Title 
VII’s definition of compensatory damages, which includes some pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2016).  
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damages. Keeping all other information constant,132 the new condition 
ended as follows: 
The court decided it was unlawful to fire the teacher and ordered the 
school to pay her in compensation for lost pay and benefits, and an 
additional $800,000 in punitive damages, which was more than a year of 
the school’s entire budget. However, the court did not order to reinstate 
Ms. Dunham to her position. 
The wording of the new outcome was designed to achieve several 
goals. First, it maximized comparison with the original compensatory 
damages condition by keeping all of the original wording, adding only 
the emphasized information (this information was not emphasized in the 
text read by participants). Second, the new condition included a high, 
supercompensatory, monetary award designed to be highly burdensome. 
The specific figure was chosen based on a rough survey of punitive 
damages awards in employment discrimination cases that showed that 
damages vary substantially, ranging from $100,000 to millions of dollars 
per case.133 The figure was meant to approximate a school’s yearly 
budget, and the budgetary implications of the award were stated in order 
to provide a meaningful context to the nominal figure and strengthen its 
impact. Under conventional economic intuitions, such a high cost—that 
essentially jeopardizes the entire operation of the school—is expected to 
outweigh the benefit the institution derives from dismissal, as 
reinstatement or more. Note that the new condition varied only the 
magnitude of the sanction but not the probability of enforcement, which 
was kept constant between conditions.134 
The design of Experiment Two therefore consisted of three 
(compensatory damages, punitive damages, and reinstatement) by two 
(standard court, particularly fair court) conditions. Everything else in the 
flow and content of the experiment remained identical to Experiment 
One, allowing for a perfect replication (and expansion) of the results. 
 
 132. This included creating two procedural variants for the new outcome treatment in order to 
match the two procedural variants of each of the other two outcomes, so that each of them had a 
standard court version and a particularly fair court version. 
 133. Compare Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend Inc., No. 1:12-CV-122 RLM, 2015 WL 
143977, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 12, 2015) (involving $2,000,000 award in an IVF pregnancy case, later 
reduced pursuant to a statutory cap), with Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251-SJD, 
2013 WL 360355 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013), appeal dismissed, (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) (providing 
$171,000 award in an out-of-wedlock pregnancy case, $100,000 of which was punitive damages); 
Memorandum and Order Pursuant to Rule 1:28 Denying Motions for Remitter , Daigle v. Rudomin, 
No. 94-P-1848, 671 N.E.2d 1014 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (providing $750,000 award in a sexual 
harassment case); Walsh v. Carney Hosp. Corp., No. 94-2583, 1998 WL 1470698 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 
10, 1998) (providing $650,000 award in a homosexuality discrimination case). 
 134. In all three conditions, participants could infer from the evolution of the dilemma into a legal 
dispute and from the unfavorable court judgment that the probability of enforcement is high. See infra 
Part II.E.6. 
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Experiment Two expanded on Experiment One in two additional 
ways. First, it sought to explore the impact of varying legal outcomes 
more generally, beyond legal adherence in the particular dilemma and 
context. Therefore, after the second teacher dilemma, Experiment Two 
elicited participants’ general perspectives on conflicts between faith and 
law. Participants were asked to state their level of agreement with 
statements such as “I believe in democracy, and sometimes we have to 
compromise values that are important to us for the sake of democracy,” 
and “I have the right to resort to illegal activities if the court or the 
government make a decision that contradicts my beliefs.”135 Participants 
rated their level of agreement on a scale of one to six, from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. The randomization into different “treatments” 
allowed for a controlled test of the impact of outcome and process on 
these general and generalizable attitudes. 
Second, Experiment Two sought to provide a richer account of the 
role of religious morality in the out-of-wedlock pregnancy dilemma and 
to assess the extent to which deviance from antidiscrimination law in 
these circumstances is a phenomenon tied to religiosity. This is an 
important task, because dismissal decisions could theoretically stem from 
sources unrelated to religiosity, like bias toward pregnant women and 
unmarried pregnancy in particular.136 Experiment Two therefore 
recruited religious and nonreligious participants, with the latter population 
serving as a control group. In addition, participants’ views on the morality 
of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and the morality of having an unmarried 
pregnant teacher in school—capturing the moral layers of the conflict 
from a religious perspective—were measured. The goal was to examine 
more closely the prevailing assumption behind the accommodation thesis 
that religious individuals would necessarily seek to defy a law that 
conflicts with their religious beliefs.137 
 
 135. The other three statements read: “There are laws that take precedence over national laws”; “I 
should respect the rule of law and legal decisions even if I disagree with them”; and, “Religious laws 
are more important to me than national laws.” These measures were adapted from sociological 
surveys on ideological compliance and deviance. Arye Rattner & Dana Yagil, Taking the Law into 
One’s Own Hands on Ideological Grounds, 32 Int’l J. Soc. L. 85 (2004); Dana Yagil & Arye Rattner, 
Between Commandments and Laws: Religiosity, Political Ideology, and Legal Obedience in Israel, 38 
Crime, L. & Soc. Change 185 (2002).  
 136. See, e.g., Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the Motherhood 
Penalty, 24 Gender & Soc’y 616 (2010); Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood 
Penalty, 59 Hastings L.J. 1359 (2008). 
 137. See supra Part II.B, for a discussion of what makes a conflict from a religious perspective, in 
particular regarding the nature of the moral wrong and the religious responsibility and regulatory aim. 
Participants were asked to provide their “personal views” on “pregnancy out of wedlock” and “having 
an unmarried pregnant teacher in school” by selecting one of four descriptions with respect to each: 
religiously or morally forbidden, more forbidden than permissible, more permissible than forbidden, 
religiously or morally permissible. The question was presented together with several demographic 
questions at the end of the study. 
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5. Experiment Two: Results 
Experiment Two recruited a total of 2244 participants, 1941 of them 
Christians and the remaining 303 unaffiliated with any particular religion 
or simply not religious (agnostic or atheist).138 
 
Adherence to Antidiscrimination Law. Similar to Experiment One, 
24.4% of the sample (548 participants) fired the unwed and pregnant 
teacher. However, the rate of dismissal decisions was significantly different 
between religious and nonreligious participants. Whereas 26.5% of 
Christians were inclined to dismiss the teacher, only 11% of the 
nonreligious group were so inclined.139 Further breakdown into religious 
affiliations revealed that dismissal rates among the unaffiliated or personal 
spiritualists, atheists, and agnostics were all between 10.8% and 11.7%. 
These figures were significantly lower than those affiliated with one of the 
Christian denominations, which ranged from 21.7% amongst mainline 




 138. The sample size (religious and nonreligious samples likewise) was determined based on power 
calculations (power = 80%), taking into account the effect sizes and standard variations that emerged 
from Experiment One and the research hypotheses of Experiment Two. SSI again administered data 
collection, and participants in the first experiment were excluded from participating in the second 
experiment. Identical procedures and methods were used in the recruitment, collection, and treatment 
of the data. The nonreligious sample consisted of Democrats and Republicans in equal numbers, like 
the religious sample. 
 139. The Pearson Chi Square statistic was 33.067, p < .001. A t-test on the raw scales measuring 
dismissal intentions yielded identical results. The mean intention to dismiss in the nonreligious group 
was -3.93 points with standard deviation of 2.4, versus a significantly higher intention of -2.57 points 
with standard deviation of 3.05 in the religious group. The t-statistic was -7.420 with 2242 degrees of 
freedom, p < .001. 
 140. Dismissal rates were high amongst all Christian denominations, including Other Christians 
(25%) and Latter-Day Saints (38.5%), though the latter group was represented by only sixteen people 
in the sample. 
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Figure 4: Teacher Dismissal and  
Religious Affiliation in Experiment Two 
Again, church attendance was a highly significant predictor of 
dismissal decisions (Figure 5), as was strength of religious identity.141 In 
addition, moral views on out-of-wedlock pregnancy and the morality of 
having an unwed pregnant teacher in school were highly predictive of 
dismissal intentions, as expected.142 At the same time, even religious 
individuals who saw these behaviors as religiously forbidden were not, 
for the most part, inclined to dismiss the pregnant teacher despite 
perceiving her behavior as religiously deviant (Figure 6). These findings 
 
 141. For church attendance, the Pearson Chi Square statistic was 102.15, p < .001 (extremely high). 
A regression predicting raw dismissal intentions from church attendance (Beta = .32), integrated 
religious identity (Beta = .19), and conservativeness (Beta = .13) yielded that the Beta coefficients of 
the religiosity measures as well as conservativeness were highly significant, independent of each other. 
The impact of religiosity on decisionmaking was robust to the inclusion of conservativeness, indicating 
that the religiosity effect was not an artifact of conservativeness. 
 142. The two questions captured views regarding first-order and second-order moral actions, in 
essence, regarding the proscribed act (pregnancy out of wedlock, in short “POOW”) and its 
acceptance (having an unwed pregnant teacher in school, in short “HPOOW”). The two evaluations 
were highly correlated (Pearson’s r-statistic was .622, p < .001) and were each highly predictive of 
dismissal intentions. The F-statistic for POOW was 36.258 with 3 degrees of freedom, p < .001, and the 
F-statistic for HPOOW was 112.25 with 3 degrees of freedom, p < .001. While, naturally, more people 
viewed first-order actions as morally forbidden (46% evaluated POOW as forbidden), a sizeable group 
(34%) viewed HPOOW, too, as morally forbidden. Most of those who disapproved of one 
disapproved also of the other (and those who approved of one also approved of the other), but some 
people crossed categories, evaluating POOW as forbidden but HPOOW as permissible, and vice versa. 
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replicate and augment the results of the first experiment. While 
nonadherence of antidiscrimination law in the pregnancy dilemma is 
significantly a function of religion and religiosity, the data also unsettles 
the assumption of necessary religious deviance. Religious individuals 
across all denominations and levels of practice, and even as they face 
clear norm conflict, appear to accommodate the conflict on their own. 
Gender and political affiliation remained significant factors as 
well.143 Due to the scarcity of nonreligious dismissals, the remainder of 
the analyses focuses on the Christian subsample. 
 
Figure 5: Teacher Dismissal and Church  
Attendance in Experiment Two 
 
 
 143. The effects were identical in direction and very similar in size to the first experiment. Men 
and Republicans were more inclined to dismiss the teacher (27.6% of men, comparable to 26% in the 
first experiment, versus 21.6% of women; 29% of Republicans, comparable to 27.6% in the first 
experiment, versus 20% of Democrats). In the multiple regression analysis, church attendance was 
again the strongest and most significant predictor of dismissal decisions (and robust to the inclusion of 
other variables). In the final iteration of the regression, the beta coefficient of church attendance was 
.355 and the t-statistic was 8.747 with 2217 degrees of freedom, p < .001. Being Evangelical or Catholic 
was significant (the t-statistics were above 2.8 and p values were .005 or below), as well as being 
Republican (a slightly weaker effect—the t-statistic was 2.06 and p = .039). Income, education, and 
race had no significant impact. 
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Figure 6: Intentions to dismiss the teacher (dichotomized based 
on the scale responses) conditioned on beliefs regarding the 
permissibility of pregnancy out of wedlock and having a pregnant out 
of wedlock teacher in school (grouped into forbidden/permissible). 
The bars represent the rate of dismissal in each belief group. 
 
Compliance with the court. Recall that participants were randomized 
into one of three follow-up scenarios: compensatory damages, 
reinstatement, and punitive damages. In each case the judicial process 
was either standard or particularly fair. An analysis of the 514 Christian 
participants who chose to dismiss the teacher144 revealed strong 
similarities to Experiment One. 
 
 
 144. Note that the number is higher than the first experiment because of the larger sample. 
Experiment Two recruited more participants to empower the study to detect an effect despite the 
addition of new treatment groups. Were Experiment Two to recruit a sample identical in size to 
Experiment One rather than enlarging it, the study would have been underpowered to detect the 
effect discovered in the first study because each group would have consisted of fewer participants (due 





Barak_Corren_21 (Hamilton).doc (Do Not Delete) 5/10/2016 4:15 PM 
May 2016]        BEHAVIOR, RELIGION, AND DISCRIMINATION 1007 
Figure 7: Obedience to the Court per Outcome and  
Procedural Fairness in Experiment Two 
 
 
First, Experiment Two replicated Experiment One. Compliance 
intentions were again high and positive in all condition groups (that is, on 
average people were inclined to obey the court) despite participants’ 
initial non-adherence. Second, as in Experiment One, these intentions 
did not differ between reinstatement and compensatory damages (Figure 
7). However, the intention to comply with a punitive damages award was 
significantly lower on average.145 Procedural fairness, as in Experiment 
One, did not improve compliance. In fact, per all outcomes, compliance 
intentions were somewhat lower when the court was described as 
particularly fair (a difference that was borderline significant).146 
The lower intention to comply with a punitive damages award is 
intriguing. From an economic perspective, it appears that individuals are 
sensitive to the magnitude of the monetary award and see the 
supercompensatory damages as an outcome more costly than both 
reinstatement and damages, reflected in the lower willingness to incur it. 
It also appears that, unlike compensatory damages and reinstatement, 
 
 145. The outcome effect resulted from the contrast between PD and the other two groups and was 
highly significant. The F-statistic was 6.2 with 2 and 508 degrees of freedom, p = .002. 
 146. The F-statistic was 3.41 with 1508 degrees of freedom, p = .065. 
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punitive damages are perceived like a harsher and less acceptable 
outcome of the conflict. 
Will this perception impact the decision to adhere or not to adhere 
to antidiscrimination law in a repeated occurrence of the dilemma? Two 
competing hypotheses are at play. The first posits that the legal outcome 
imposed by the court primarily motivates adherence by reducing the 
gains of nonadherence. As punitive damages were apparently perceived 
the most burdensome of all outcomes, they are expected to yield more 
subsequent adherence to the law than both compensatory damages and 
reinstatement, as people would like to avoid additional occurrences of 
this outcome in particular. The alternative hypothesis posits that legal 
outcomes primarily influence adherence through the normative messages 
they convey. Thus, punitive damages are expected to yield intermediate 
adherence to the law: less than reinstatement, which sends a firmer 
message, but more than compensatory damages, due to the added 
punitive message. 
In short, the results lend support to the second hypothesis (Figure 
7). Participants in the reinstatement group were more likely to adhere to 
antidiscrimination law and keep the second teacher than participants in 
both the compensatory and punitive damages groups.147 
 
 147. This finding is both a replication and extension of the first experiment. The average 
adherence to the law in each group was +0.7 in Reinstatement, -0.1 in Compensatory Damages (CS), 
+0.01 in Punitive Damages (PS). Standard deviations were 3.1, 3, and 3.3 respectively. The analysis 
was robust to the inclusion of prior decisions. The F-statistic of outcome was 3.045 with 2 and 506 
degrees of freedom, p = .048. A within-subject repeated-measures analysis on first and second 
dismissal choices, controlling for level of compliance with the court, yielded virtually identical results 
(the F statistic for outcome was 3.63 with 2 and 508 degrees of freedom, p = .027). As expected, given 
that the treatment was only administered after the first dismissal was made, the average scores in that 
decision did not significantly differ between the groups (-1.84 in reinstatement, -1.86 in CS, -2.2 in PS 
with standard deviations of 1.7, 1.75, and 1.78). As in the first experiment, adherence intentions were 
overall higher among previously nonadherent participants, reflecting that the negative court judgment 
increased subsequent adherence decisions in all outcome groups. 
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Figure 8: Projected Effect of Outcome on Adherence to 
Antidiscrimination Law, Experiment Two 
 
Figure 8: Participants who originally decided to dismiss the 
teacher in contravention of antidiscrimination law (N = 514) 
significantly differed in their post-court decisions. Participants 
informed that the court reinstated the teacher were more likely to 
adhere to the law in a subsequent dilemma than participants in the two 
damages conditions who were more likely to dismiss the teacher.  
F = 3.63, p = .027. Further analysis revealed that punitive damages 
fared somewhat better than compensatory damages. 
 
While the analysis of the raw scale responses yielded virtually no 
difference between the two damages conditions, in terms of actual 
dismissal decisions the results were more nuanced: 52% of the 
reinstatement group retained the second teacher in the aftermath of the 
court decision, whereas only 39% of participants in the compensatory 
damages group did so (these figures are nearly identical to those of 
Experiment One). Adherence in the punitive damages group was 
intermediate, with 48% of the participants retaining the teacher.148 Punitive 
damages, then, fare somewhat better than compensatory damages on this 
secondary analysis. But despite the evidence that people perceive 
punitive damages as costlier than reinstatement, and contrary to the 
 
 148. For this analysis, the raw scale was dichotomized into dismissed or not based on the scale 
midpoint (0). The result was statistically significant, the Pearson Chi Square statistic was 6.024, p < .05. 
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price hypothesis, punitive damages do not increase adherence to 
antidiscrimination norms beyond reinstatement. 
Furthermore, analyzing the general perceptions regarding the rule 
of law of participants in the sample149 revealed that punitive damages 
yielded the lowest respect toward the rule of law and lowest appreciation 
of democracy.150 Meanwhile, it yielded the highest willingness to resort to 
illegal activities in conflicts between law and faith and declare religious 
law more important than national laws.151 Reinstatement and 
compensatory damages did not differ.152 Hence, not only that punitive 
damages fail to increase adherence beyond reinstatement, they also 
appear to jeopardize respect toward the rule of law and compliance with 
the law in future conflicts between law and religion. 
In sum, Experiment Two replicates the finding that reinstatement is 
not perceived as less acceptable than damages and projects higher 
adherence to antidiscrimination law in a subsequent conflict, and reveals 
that this effect persists and exacerbates for punitive damages that even 
appear to backlash. Notably, as in the first experiment, participants who 
did not originally elect to dismiss the teacher (the adherent cohort) were 
not influenced by outcome or procedural fairness and maintained high 
adherence intentions. 
6. Discussion 
Two experiments reveal that adherence and nonadherence to the 
law are largely influenced by religiosity, relevant moral beliefs, and 
 
 149. See supra note 135 for a description of the statements. The statements were divided into two 
composite measures, reflecting positive (“P-RL”) and negative (“N-RL”) views toward the rule of law, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .532, .523 respectively. P-RL included the statements: “I should respect the rule of 
law and legal decisions even if I disagree with them,” and “I believe in democracy, and sometimes we 
have to compromise values that are important to us for the sake of democracy.” N-RL included the 
statements: “Religious laws are more important to me than national laws” and “I have the right to 
resort to illegal activities if the court or the government make a decision that contradicts my beliefs.” 
The fifth statement—“There are laws that take precedence over national laws”—did not fit with either 
group (perhaps for lack of direct relevance to religion) and was excluded from the analysis. As the 
question goes beyond the issue of compliance in the specific given case, the analysis looked into the 
perceptions of all participants irrespective of whether they originally adhered to the law. Yet outcome 
had a significant effect in each of the nonadherent and adherent cohorts, with respect to positive views 
toward the rule of law (P-RL). 
 150. In the Punitive group the average P-RL was 4.27 versus a higher average of 4.43 in both 
Reinstatement and Compensatory Damages groups (standard deviations were 1.032, 1.053, 1.083 
respectively). The F-statistic was 4.74, with 2 and 1935 degrees of freedom, p = .009. 
 151. In the Punitive group the average N-RL was 3.19 versus lower averages of 3.14 in 
Reinstatement and 3.01 in Compensatory Damages (standard deviations were 1.295, 1.347, 1.275 
respectively). The F-statistic was 2.033, with 2 and 1935 degrees of freedom, p = .048. 
 152. Procedural fairness had no impact on negative views of the rule of law and a small negative 
impact on positive views of the rule of law. In the standard court group the average P-RL was 4.44 
versus 4.32 in the particularly fair condition. The negative fairness effect persisted within each 
outcome group. The F-statistic was 6.027, with 2 and 1935 degrees of freedom, p = .014. 
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religious affiliation. Political conservativeness and gender have an 
impact, albeit a smaller one. A sizeable group of about 25% of religious 
individuals is originally inclined to dismiss a pregnant out-of-wedlock 
teacher—by no means a small minority—but at the same time, majorities 
in every denominational group, levels of practice, and even people who 
personally believe that pregnancy out-of-wedlock is religiously forbidden 
do not seek to dismiss the teacher. These results cast doubt on the 
assumption that conflicts between legal obligations and religious 
convictions can only be resolved through some measure of 
accommodations. Evidence from several directions, from the approaches 
taken by senior religious managers, through participants’ dismissal 
decisions, to the processes reflected in their reactions to the judicial 
decision in the experiments, all suggest that religious people might have 
various ways to deal with conflicts of values other than defy the law or 
seek accommodations—ways that are substantially more inclusive. 
The results also call into question the common judicial practice of 
substituting damages for performance in religious conflicts. While judges 
believe that monetary damages are more acceptable than reinstatement, 
participants in both experiments did not disclose different assessments of 
the two outcomes and indicated high intentions to comply with both. At 
the same time, monetary substitutes were significantly less likely to 
engender subsequent adherence to antidiscrimination law. Though 
supercompensatory punitive damages fared somewhat better than 
compensatory damages, they invoked lower obedience to the court and 
more negative views of the law than both reinstatement and compensatory 
damages. 
The experiments indicate that religious adherence to 
antidiscrimination law is shaped and influenced by the court and the 
normative message that it projects through the outcome it orders. They 
show that when courts decide cases, they influence not only how people 
interpret their legal obligations, but also how they approach their 
religious commitments. Reinstatement affirms antidiscrimination norms 
and yields higher intentions to adhere to them than damages—
compensatory or punitive—that seem to signal that antidiscrimination 
norms can be bought out. These results correspond with previous studies 
that found that monetary sanctions could crowd out norms, yet the 
direction of the effect is different in the present context. With respect to 
a context that involves competing norms and a cohort for which baseline 
commitment to the law is low to begin with, damages do not simply 
crowd out legal commitment; rather, they crowd in less of it. 
Considered together, the diverse empirical data presented in this 
Article invite constitutional scholars and courts to reconsider the basic 
assumptions underlying the debate on antidiscrimination and religious 
accommodations. Current legal doctrine risks providing sweeping and 
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unnecessary religious accommodations that might erode antidiscrimination 
protections without reducing conflict. The negative impact might not be 
restricted to potential religious objectors. Overly broad accommodations 
might also steer otherwise adherent individuals to exclude and discriminate, 
by weakening norms of compliance and commitment to antidiscrimination 
values and increasing socioreligious pressure to use the accommodation. 
Courts should therefore consider, and scholars should study, the projected 
effects of different legal outcomes in recurring and intensifying conflicts 
such as the clash between religious convictions and antidiscrimination 
law. This applies to the effectiveness of substituting monetary damages 
for legal compliance and is particularly true for high punitive damages. 
While they might encourage adherence more than compensatory 
damages, they are still less effective than reinstatement and invoke 
higher objection to the law. This objection is likely to be translated into 
appeals or other efforts to avoid compliance. 
III.  Lessons and Implications 
Behavioral research in recent years has demonstrated a growing 
ability to examine complex social problems and inform policymakers.153 
Building on behavioral insights and methods, this Article elucidates the 
impact of some of the key mechanisms that animate conflicts between 
religious convictions and antidiscrimination by studying how they are 
perceived and decided by religious people. While the Article focused on 
educational settings, the lessons drawn here may be relevant to other 
arenas of conflict that follow the same basic contours: normative clashes 
where religious objectors seek autonomy to manage their affairs 
according to their religious beliefs in a manner that relates to the conduct 
of people who are suspected or found to engage in a religiously 
proscribed behavior that is protected by law. As recent years demonstrate, 
such conflicts are not restricted to sectarian schools (though they are 
certainly pervasive in that setting). Rather, individuals running small and 
large for-profit businesses increasingly run into similar conflicts and 
demand similar exemptions. Acknowledging this trend does not 
necessarily require to do away with the legal distinctions between public 
and private, for-profit and non-for-profit, and other settings. Instead, the 
proliferation of conflict across different legal settings should prompt 
further investigation as to the mechanisms generating these similarities. 
The present research brings us closer to understanding the shared 
foundations and ensuing dynamics of conflicts between religion and 
 
 153. Noah J. Goldstein et al., A Room with a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate 
Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J. Consumer Res. 472 (2008); Michael Hallsworth et al., The 
Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20007, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20007. 
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antidiscrimination. Further research would be necessary to understand 
how these dynamics operate in other settings of conflict. 
A. What Role for Fairness and Punitiveness? 
Among the many questions that remain open for future studies, the 
role of procedural fairness is particularly intriguing. Why did procedural 
fairness have no positive impact on compliance? 
One possibility is that people need to see and experience fairness 
rather than read about it, and that fairness information is simply not 
enough to generate an effect. While this explanation is plausible, it is 
harder to square with previous studies that used similar methods and did 
find fairness effects.154 
Another possibility is that people are more sensitive to a substantial 
lack of fairness than to the difference between a standard court and an 
exceedingly fair court. While the absence of an “unfair court” treatment 
might seem like a limitation of the experimental design, it was driven by 
the research goals—to examine tools that might aid judges to reduce 
conflict, not exacerbate it. Pointing out the hazards of unfairness was 
therefore of little theoretical and practical value compared with 
uncovering the potential benefits of enhanced fairness. The lack of 
finding for such benefits, however, suggests limited room for procedural 
fairness in mitigating conflicts between law and religion.155 Perhaps the 
effect of procedural fairness has a ceiling. Or, it might be capped or 
moderated by people’s priors regarding the courts.156 This is not to say, of 
 
 154. See, e.g., Tom Tyler, Governing amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking Procedures 
on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 Law & Soc. Rev. 809 (1994) (reporting an experiment that 
randomized participants to read one of several procedural fairness descriptions and found significant 
effects on participants’ support and willingness to accept the decision). 
 155. This might be part of a broader limitation on fairness in private law settings, which derives 
from the fact that the state is not the primary actor but rather a mediator between parties to the civil 
procedure. As such, the fairness of legal authorities might take a back seat while the fairness of the 
rival party takes primary focus. I thank Dave Hoffman for suggesting this point. Note, however, that in 
normative conflicts as the one studied here, the state may nevertheless be seen as taking a direct action 
against the religious institution when it casts its moral weight behind the rival party. The broad 
limitation is therefore less likely to explain the lack of fairness effect here. 
 156. The present study did not measure participants’ priors regarding courts’ fairness for a lack of 
satisfying ways to do so. If the study would have asked participants for their views prior to making 
adherence and compliance decisions it would have risked biasing their decisions. If such questions 
were presented after those decisions, the responses would have likely been biased by the differing 
descriptions of the court as more or less fair. In light of this difficulty, I conducted a pilot study prior to 
the experiment where I attempted to examine the impact of fairness priors on obedience to a standard 
versus particularly fair court (N = 300; the pilot was recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and 
adapted the dilemma to fit a general audience; the fairness treatments remained identical). One might 
suspect such priors to interact with the experiment in one of two ways. First, if people hold favorable 
views regarding the courts, they might read them into the description of the standard court and 
imagine it to be fairer than described, eroding the designed differences between fairness conditions. 
The pilot study did not support this hypothesis: people who perceived courts as generally fair did not 
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course, that legal authorities can forgo their fairness commitments; such 
steps would severely misinterpret the results of the experiments and 
might have dire consequences (indeed, I did not study the floor to which 
adherence might drop were the court to be presented as unfair). The 
experimental results also say nothing of the impact of fairness in legislative 
procedures—as opposed to court procedures—on adherence with laws that 
emerged from these procedures. 
This Article also leaves open questions regarding the negative 
impact associated with punitive damages. Unlike compensatory damages, 
which might be perceived as a mere price that people pay for their 
religious preferences, punitive damages are likely to be perceived as a 
price and a normative message combined. If this normative message were 
as effective as that communicated by reinstatement, punitive damages 
should have matched or superseded reinstatement in adherence rates. 
Experiment Two reveals that this is not the case. But one cannot rule out 
the possibility that punitive damages fare worse than reinstatement 
because the added message is not the right message. People might be open 
to accepting the notion that the law should prevail, but not that religion 
should be punished. Punitive damages might therefore fail to engender 
higher adherence because their normative message is taken as offensive 
and derogative. A fine balance needs to be struck when choosing 
between legal outcomes. 
B. Taking Behavior Seriously When Designing Accommodations 
The data throughout this Article offer important insight for the 
debate on whether and how to accommodate religious beliefs. First, the 
data unsettles the common assumption that the religious position on 
conflicts between law and religion is uniform, oppositional, and firm. 
While high religiosity is indeed correlated with greater deviance from 
antidiscrimination law, the data also uncovers substantial heterogeneity 
and variation, indicating that the religious attitudes to antidiscrimination 
law are more complex, nuanced, and dynamic than previously assumed. 
Among other findings, the experiments show that an impressive majority 
of religious individuals would not disobey antidiscrimination law even 
when it directly conflicts with their beliefs, and that a majority of 
 
differ from people who perceived them as generally unfair when responding to a standard court 
dilemma. A second possibility is that people who hold unfavorable views regarding the courts would 
read them into the description of the particularly fair court and imagine it to be less fair than 
described, again leading to an erosion of the designed difference between the fairness conditions, this 
time from the opposite direction. The pilot provided some support to this hypothesis: people who 
perceived the courts as generally unfair were slightly less likely to obey a particularly fair court than 
those who perceived courts as generally fair. This might suggest that negative fairness priors might be 
harder to overcome in experiments and potentially in real life too. Further research is needed to 
understand the reasons behind the lack of fairness effects. 
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religious objectors would tend to accept an unfavorable judicial decision 
and adjust their behavior in future rounds of the conflict. Some of the 
data, such as the managerial accounts of a “kind heart” approach and 
participants’ reactions to the judicial decision, even suggest that 
convergence between religious and legal norms is possible and is already 
occurring on the ground. Together, these data propose that one should 
not be too quick to assume that religious exemptions are the only tool 
available to mitigate the conflict from a religious perspective, and that 
other means should be explored and studied. In particular, future 
research should examine the impact of various forms of accommodations 
and explore prospects for convergence between law and religion. 
The second related insight is that theoretically interchangeable 
policy measures might vary substantially in practice as a result of their 
normative interpretation. This insight might assist lawmakers and judges 
who deliberate between alternative means aimed to reduce conflict, 
including alternative forms of religious accommodations. The evidence 
suggests that in such cases, lawmakers, courts and legal scholars should 
consider and research the perceptions and meanings that accommodations 
generate. Based on the evidence presented in this Article, I propose that 
successful accommodations should be constructed, to the extent possible, 
between three cornerstones: they should affirm legal values, should not 
signal that the law is for sale, and should not signal that religious beliefs 
warrant punishment. The most effective accommodations will probably 
need to walk the fine line between the two normative titans of law and 
religion, affirming the importance of the law while altering the means by 
which the law is performed and enforced. 
One example for an accommodation that had the potential to follow 
this formula is the certification made to insurance issuers or third-party 
administrators under the ACA,157 which was provided on an expanded 
basis after the Hobby Lobby decision.158 This accommodation requires 
 
 157. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.131(b)(4), (c)(1)–(2) (2015); 26 C.F.R. §§ 54.9815–2713A(a)(4), (b), 
(c)(2) (2015). 
 158. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41317 
(July 14, 2015). The accommodation, as applied to nonprofit religious organizations, has been upheld 
to date by five federal appeals courts against challenges by several schools and charities, and at the 
time this Article went to print, appeals on these decisions were pending before the Supreme Court in 
Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2924 (2015). See Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 
2015); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015); 
Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted 
in part sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Geneva Coll. v. 
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 
(D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 
444 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 136 S. Ct. 
446 (2015); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015), 
cert. granted sub nom. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 445 (2015) and cert. granted in part sub 
nom. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015). 
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religious objectors to notify their insurers or the government. The 
contraceptive coverage is then expressly excluded from the health 
insurance plan of the objector, and the responsibility for coverage shifts 
to the insurer (whether responsibility indeed shifted became a major 
point of disagreement between religious nonprofits and the government, 
see below). The insurer provides separate payments for contraceptives at 
no cost to employees, and employees of religious employers are not 
disparaged. 
This form of accommodation aims to affirm the importance of 
contraceptive coverage and the law that enacted it by upholding the 
autonomy of women and men to make their own procreative decisions. 
All employees receive access to contraceptives on the same terms 
without additional costs. At the same time, this accommodation attempts 
to alter the means through which law’s standards are met by shifting the 
moral responsibility from the religious objector to the insurer. This 
combination appears to strike the appropriate balance between 
upholding the values that the law seeks to promote while allowing 
religious objectors to opt out, but not buy out (thereby minimizing the 
risk of normative erosion). Yet, as I write, controversy and litigation still 
surround this accommodation. Understanding why would require a 
separate study. For now, I shall make two careful observations. First, it is 
possible that if the federal government had negotiated differently with 
religious leaders and had offered this accommodation earlier and on a 
general basis (without limiting it to religious nonprofits), it could have 
preempted some of the conflicts that have since erupted, such as the 
conflict with Hobby Lobby itself as well as some of the recent court 
challenges.159 Second, it seems that the ACA accommodation was drafted 
without sufficient sensitivity to its religious audience. Specifically, with 
respect to the single most important sentence in the accommodation, the 
one that describes how the accommodation operates, the law states that 
the notice of religious objection “shall be an instrument under which the 
plan is operated, [and] shall be treated as a designation of the third party 
administrator as the plan administrator . . . for any contraceptive services 
required to be covered.”160 Surely enough, the accommodation 
establishes a mechanism that shifts responsibility from employers to 
insurers. But describing the notice of religious objection as the 
 
 159. Against the background of these challenges, the ACA’s accommodation hardly seems like an 
exemplar of conflict mitigation. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. At the present time, 
however, we lack knowledge as to how the accommodation would have been perceived were the 
government to offer it in the first place, not in response to litigation. As Hobby Lobby was framed as a 
victory for faith groups, the accommodation that followed the decision was probably perceived as an 
expression of legal weakness rather than an affirmation of the ACA’s values, and hence plausibly 
triggered more challenges. 
 160. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-16(b) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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instrument that facilitates access to contraceptives shows a lack of 
sensitivity to religious concerns and modes of reasoning. Given the 
evidence on what makes a conflict from a religious perspective161 and the 
importance of tailoring legal means to reflect a careful normative 
message,162 I expect that the ACA accommodation could have fared 
better if a more careful set of definitions and words was used. This 
analysis, of course, is cautiously stated.163 The main lesson offered by this 
Article is that a careful empirical examination is warranted to fully 
understand the direct and projected influences of alternative policy 
measures, including religious accommodations. 
C. Complicating the Relationship Between Legal Outcomes and 
Behavior 
This Article presented different types of evidence—qualitative and 
experimental—that, by virtue of their methodological differences, 
interact to illuminate the dynamics of the conflict between religion and 
antidiscrimination. This interaction also complicates the account that 
each method separately provides. Consider the following two sets of 
findings. On the experimental front, the evidence indicates that religious 
people who were inclined to dismiss a pregnant out-of-wedlock teacher 
were willing to comply with a reinstatement decision, a decision which in 
turn increases their intention to adhere to antidiscrimination law in the 
future. On the other hand, the qualitative evidence indicates that 
religious managers who considered reinstatement typically objected to 
this outcome and thought it unlikely to materialize (indeed, many have 
not thought it to be a serious option). How can we explain this tension? 
One explanation is that managers’ attitudes are shaped by their 
interactions with courts and lawyers, and are therefore epiphenomenal to 
the rareness of reinstatement decisions in the real world. Without 
experiencing reinstatement decisions, it is not surprising that managers 
are both relatively unaware of this remedy and perceive it as outside the 
normative spectrum. The experiments, then, provide a window into what 
could happen should courts shift gears and hold people and institutions 
accountable to their primary obligations under antidiscrimination law. 
An alternative explanation points to the complexity of real life 
relationships. Manager #11 reasoned her reinstatement aversion in the 
following words:  
I think that in most cases, to be very honest with you, very few teachers 
want to come back into an environment after they have sued the 
school. Where relationships have just totally been decimated. And 
then often, I believe, if you were to do research you would find that, I 
 
 161. See supra Part II.B. 
 162. See supra Part II.E. 
 163. I develop this issue in a separate work in progress. 
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can’t help but believe in the overwhelming number of cases there has 
been a financial settlement in order for the teacher not to return to the 
classroom. 
It is difficult to assess whether this claim (made by a manager) 
accurately represents the wishes of the dismissed individual. Recent cases 
demonstrate that teachers and communities sometimes do ask for 
reinstatement.164 Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that individuals who 
initially sought reinstatement would eventually decide not to return to a 
workplace that previously shunned them, or that managers would 
attempt to negotiate a settlement to avoid the complexity of rebuilding 
relationships. Such dynamics could lead to fewer actual reinstatements 
than those granted, should courts indeed begin granting reinstatements. 
Yet such a pattern, if true, should not deter courts from granting 
sought reinstatement—so long as employees seek this remedy—and the 
interim orders necessary to keep it feasible.165 Even if some parties will 
eventually decide to forgo reinstatement in favor of financial settlement, 
the lasting impact of the reinstatement decision is likely to hold. This is 
because, firstly, the affirmation of antidiscrimination values expressed by 
the court in a reinstatement decision would remain intact. This 
affirmative message is also likely to transcend the specific parties and 
reach other institutions in similar situations. Indeed, the interviews 
reveal that religious managers closely follow the legal experiences of 
their counterparts across the nation. As relevant news diffuse rapidly, it 
may not need more than a critical mass of merited reinstatement 
decisions to communicate a shift in judicial approach and with it a 
reconsideration of existing practices. Secondly, even if some individuals 
will eventually decide to settle, a decision that confers the power to make 
the ultimate decision upon the individual who has experienced 
discrimination is empowering both for the individual and for the law. 
Finally, institutions and individuals negotiating in the shadow of a 
reinstatement award will likely reach higher financial settlements, which 
 
 164. Amanda Finelli, Catholic Schools’ “Morality Clause” Is No Excuse for Firing LGBT Teachers, 
Guardian (Oct. 25, 2013, 9:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/catholic- 
schools-fires-gay-teachers. Notably, studies that investigated why employees reject reinstatement 
found two primary causes: the amount of time that lapsed since discharge, which often made 
reinstatement infeasible, and fears of employer backlash or retaliation. When employers offered to 
reinstate the employees, the great majority of employees decided to come back. Martha West, The 
Case Against Reinstatement, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 31 (“In the NLRB figures, if employers offer 
reinstatement as part of the informal settlement process, employees are more likely to go back to work 
(73% accept) . . . .”). 
 165. The importance of interim measures is demonstrated in previous empirical studies that found 
that unless reinstatement is granted within a few (one to four) months after discharge, employees are 
unlikely to go back. When tribunals and courts order reinstatement a year or more after discharge, as 
part of a final resolution, it was substantially less likely to materialize. See Les Aspin, Legal Remedies 
Under the NLRA: Remedies Under 8(a)(3), 23 Indus. Rel. Res. Ass’n Series 264, 267 (1970). 
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would raise the price of violating the antidiscrimination norm in 
subsequent conflicts. 
In summary, even if reinstatement is ordered but eventually waived 
for a favorable settlement, increasing reinstatement orders could still 
encourage greater adherence to the law than awarding damages. Courts 
interested in promoting equality where religious exemptions do not 
apply should therefore need to revisit their remedial practices. Doing so 
would not necessarily endanger compliance with the court or court 
legitimacy, as this Article shows. Instead, the interaction between the legal 
message and religious beliefs could actually encourage reconciliation and 
convergence.166 Reinstatement might not always materialize, but for 
many religious decisionmakers like Participant #1538 in Experiment 
One,  
This [could] be a good real-life teaching opportunity . . . . There may be 
many wonderful things to learn from and grow from this experience 
(whatever the specific details may be). At the very least (though what I 
am about to say is far from “least”) the children can learn first-hand 
about the sanctity of life. The teacher may need her job now, more 
than ever. That can teach them about God’s love and forgiveness. 
 
 166. Further research would be necessary to achieve a more complete understanding of the 
religious dynamics post-reinstatement. Alongside forgiveness and greater inclusiveness, some 
employers might be motivated to restore their authority and reaffirm religious values in ways that 
could complicate the reintegration of the dismissed individual. The dynamics of acceptance, 
reintegration, and reinterpretation of both legal and religious norms require more detailed examination. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Conditions 
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Damages: Very Fair Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
